Confrontation with DRDO

Confrontation with DRDO

It was the year 1989. The Mechanized Infantry  wanted a shorter rifle for its  troops since the then existing 7.62 Self Loading Rifle was unsuited and clumsy to handle in the closed confines of the Infantry Combat vehicles  involving more time for the soldiers to dismount and mount. This also resulted in more time for the ICV to scoot after disgorging the troops.  

The Rifle 7.62 mm 1A1 which is also known as Ishapore 1A1, is a copy of the UK L1A1 which again is a copy of Belgian original self-loading rifle. It was manufacrured by the Ordnance Factories Board undr license   though DRDO claims that it is their brain child even today. It differs from the UK SLR in that the wooden butt-stock uses the butt-plate from the Lee–Enfield with trap for oil bottle and cleaning pull-through.

A proposal was sent by Army Headquarters for a shorter weapon or a shorter version of the existing SLR for all the troops of Mechanized Infantry Battalions to start with. DRDO and The directorate of EME were tasked to identify and propose how best it could be done without much financial implications.

It is important to know some basic technical specification of the rifle here. Its overall length is 46.46 in or 1180 mm with barrel length of 533 mm without flash eliminator and 616 mm with flash eliminator whose length is 83 mm.  The initial proposal of DRDO to do away with the flash eliminator was quickly set aside for very obvious reasons as it would give away the position of the soldier after the first shot itself!

The DRDO then proposed that they   would modify the existing 7.62 SLR by reducing the length of the barrel to 16 inches. However, they would have to modify the assembly line process to cut off the barrel to reduce its length, cut groves for the flash eliminator and proposed a year for development , trials and testing  and a fancy escalation cost over the current PV rate for the Army.

The Army HQ sent the proposal to the Director General EME for their study and recommendations who in turn forwarded the same to No 1 EME Centre who are the final word in respect of Small Arms. It is the nodal agency for training on repairs of Small Arms of not only Army but also of Police forces. At one time even Naval and Air Force personnel were trained here till they established their own raining facility. The No 3 Training Battalion was and is the agency for Small Arms repairs and maintenance. And I was officiating as the Commanding Officer of the Battalion when this paper was dent for our views. I had a veteran specialist on Small Arms Lt. Col . Birender Singh , a Para trooper as the Chief Instructor .

At the very outset, I was unhappy with the proposal of DRDO as I thought it would be a great fallacy to tamper with technical parameter of any system, more so a weapon where every part is engineered with great precision.  The effectiveness of a rifle is based on its accuracy for a given range.  The range is decided by the muzzle velocity of the bullet as it leaves the barrel. The propellant filled in the cartridge is designed to take the bullet to the designed target to penetrate. Also the rear sight is aligned with the foresight by adjusting the thumb screw to select the range from 200 yds to 600 yds in this weapon.

It immediately occurred to me that by shortening the barrel, the muzzle velocity will reduce, there by its range and unless the rear sight  is calibrated for range , it will lose both accuracy as well as effectiveness. I discussed these aspects with Lt. Col Birender Singh and asked him whether he has any other alternative. He came up with a brilliant idea.

As I said earlier in the Indian version of LIAI , the Butt was modified to accommodate the Oil Bottle and pull through for cleaning the barrel. While it is a necessity for an infantry soldier, a mechanized Infantry soldier has a lot of space to keep them centrally in the Combat Vehicle itself. Since he does not carry his Pack 08 or haversack as these can be held under the seat , we could even make a small pouch to be fastened to the belt if it was found absolutely essential to carry a pull through and oil bottle in combat!  So we proposed to reduce the Length of the Butt to the required overall length asked for by the Army HQ. I sent my observations to EME Directorate and asked them permission to modify a weapon as per our plan. It was agreed and the proposal was approved and sent to Army HQ WE by the Directorate General EME.

Gen BC Joshi then Army Commander Southern Command ( later he became COAS) visited the units and Establishments in Secunderabad. He as an Armoured Corps officer and Army Commander has read these proposals of DRDO and of DGEME.  He visited the 3 Training battalion specifically to see the modified weapon. I briefed him on the pros and cons of DRDO proposal and emphasized that one should not disturb the basic design of a weapon especially the barrel  length which is arrived at based on various other considerations of  range, accuracy and effectiveness of the bullet. In a lighter vein I said only criminals saw off the barrel to hide the weapon for assassinations!  He had a hearty laugh but appreciated our view point. Based on the recommendations sent by HQ Southern Command on the orders of Army Commander, the proposal of DRDO was dropped and Mechanized Infantry was saved from getting sawed off 7.62 SLR .

In a few months time, I was posted and took over as Commanding officer of an EME battalion to convert the Infantry Division EME Bn to EME Battalion Rapid (S) in Western Command and Gen Joshi also moved as Army Commander Western Command! He visited the formation to check on the progress of the raising of the Armoured Brigade and the associated Armoured Workshop.  It is another story 

With this kind of technical expertise at their disposal, they convinced the MoD that they would develop a most modern weapon System and called it INSAS . How much money was poured into its development , production and scrapping it is another story!   One can even read it in Wikipedia by searching for Insas weapon system! 

DRDO and I

My confrontation with DRDO started when I was young captain posted in HQ Southern Command ,PUNE.  I have passed my B.E (Mech)  from Madras University in 1969  in First Class. My acdemic performance in the Army was also quite impressive. The Year was 1976.  I was selected and called for a final interview for attending  a Course of Study on "Military Vehicle Technology " , a Post graduate Course  for a duration of more than  year at Royal Military College of Science Shrevenham UK.There were two candidates , one who was not selected for the UK Course was to do a PG Couese at VJTI Bombay on Automobile Engineering. It was also planned that the one who did the Course in UK would start and conduct a Course for Officers in IAT ( Institute of Armament Technology    now renamed as AIT , Army Institute of Technology). AIT was , like  now was under the control of DRDO though many senior officers were instructors on military equipment along with Civilian Professors teaching general engineering subjects.

 I was interviewed by a panel of top academicians from IITs headed by(Late)  Prof. MGK Menon , the then Scientific Adviser to the then Defence Minister.  I was declared selected to undergo the course in UK. The other officer by default was detailed for doing PG at VJTI Bombay, now Mumbai!

AIT  had a very good technical library . Being a non member of the library, I obtained a special permission to use / borrow books from it for preparing myself for the interview which I expected to be quite intense and  grueling. Before I departed  for the interview, I returned the books to the libraray and got my deposit back.  When the librarian asked me why why I was terminating my membership, I told him the reason for  consulting the books and if I got selected may be I would become a staff member here to start a new course by the end of next year! That  disclosure was the greatest blunder I had ever made in my life was not known to me then . This was somehow conveyed to the then Chief of AIT!

The AIT and DRDO had other plans . There were  no civilian professors  on their rolls at that time to teach this subject. They did not want a uniformed officer to head that new department if it was started next year. They got around to MoD and the sanction for my departure was got  deliberately delayed and the Course already commenced in UK. The other officer already joined VJTI  Mumbai!

 I put up my representation through proper channel that I should be detailed  during next year since I lost the chance to do the PG Course in VJTI.  I got a grim reply that I could not claim for derailment for a course of study as a matter of right! To add insult to injury I was detailed to do course on  Pilotless Target Air Craft for a duration of four month in October of the same year. I told my Head of EME  in HQ Southern Command , Brig. SN Bhaskar that I wanted to decline this course as I would stand to lose my PG Course next year . He gave his sage advice that a bird in hand was  worth two in the bush and I might not be considered for selection for this course next year or the course might not even be included. ! The next year , a Civilian staff from AIT ( DRDO )was detailed to attend the same course in UK without a selection process or interview!
How as a young officer of the rank of a captain, I came o know of this ? You may ask! Before I got posted to HQ Southern Command m, I was serving in an EME battalion and took part in the Bangladesh operation in Eastern Command. One of the OC workshops then Major. BM Sablok  was posted as an instructor in AIT in Pune around the same time I was posted in HQ Southern Command.  It was he who told me later as to how the AIT  with  the help of DRDO managed to ensure that their officer was sent for the course next year in my place!
 That is the power of Civilian beurocrats over uniformed officers in MoD!
Over the three decades plus of my Army service,  I had come across  many instances the stranglehold of beurocrats in  MoD and MoD Production on Service Headquarters!

Armed Forces , Beurocracy and Politicians

An article by an IAS officer is reproduced below

                        An Excellent article by an IAS officer on "INDIAN ARMY"

We need a permanent solution to this tussle over emoluments so that the armed forces need only confront the enemies of the nation, says T.R.Ramaswami, IAS.

In the continuing debate on pay scales for the armed forces, there has to be a serious and transparent effort to ensure that the country is not faced with an unnecessary civil-military confrontation. That effort will have to come from the netas, who are the real and true bosses of the armed forces and not the civil bureaucracy. A solution may lie in what follows.

This country requires the best armed forces, the best police and the best civil service. In fact that is what the British ensured. By best one means that a person chooses which service he wants as per his desires / capabilities and not based on the vast differential in prospects in the various services.

How much differential is there?

Take Maharashtra, one of the most parsimonious with police ranks thus still retaining some merit -

The 1981 IPS batch have become 3-star generals, the 1987 are 2-star and the 1994 1-star.

In the army the corresponding years are 1972, 1975, 1979. i.e. a differential of 10-15 years. While the differential is more with the IAS, the variance with the IPS is all the more glaring because both are uniformed services and the grades are "visible" on the shoulders.

First some general aspects. Only the armed forces are a real profession, i.e.  where you rise to the top only by joining at the bottom. We have had professors of economics become Finance Secretaries or even Governors of RBI. We have any number of MBBSs, engineers, MBAs, in the police force though what their qualifications lend to their jobs is a moot point. You can join at any level in the civil service, except Cabinet Secretary. A civil servant can move from Animal Husbandry to Civil Aviation to Fertilisers to Steel to yes, unfortunately, even to Defence. But the army never asks for Brigade Commanders or a Commandant of the Army War College or even Director General Military Intelligence, even from RAW or IB. Army officers can and have moved into organizations like IB and RAW but it is never the other way round. MBBS and Law graduates are only in the Medical or JAG Corps and do nothing beyond their narrow areas. Every Army Chief - in any army - has risen from being a commander of a platoon to company to battalion to brigade to division to corps to army. In fact the professionalism is so intense that no non-armoured corps officer ever commands an armoured formation , first and possibly only exception in world military history is General K. Sunderji. Perhaps it is this outstanding professionalism that irks the civil services.

Next, one must note the rigidity and steep pyramid of the army's rank structure. In the civil services any post is fungible with any grade based on political expediency and the desires of the service. For example I know of one case where one department downgraded one post in another state and up-graded one in Mumbai just to enable someone continue in Mumbai after promotion!

You can't fool around like this in the armed forces. A very good Brigadier cannot be made a Major-General and continue as brigade commander. There has to be a clear vacancy for a Major General and even then there may be others better than him. Further the top five ranks in the army comprise only 10% of the officer strength. Contrast this with the civil services where entire batches become Joint Secretaries.

Even the meaning of the word "merit" is vastly different in the army and the civil services. Some years back an officer of the Maharashtra cadre claimed that he should be the Chief Secretary as he was first in the merit list. Which merit list? At the time of entry more than 35 years before! The fact is that this is how merit is decided in the IAS and IPS. Every time a batch gets promoted the inter-se merit is still retained as at the time of entry. In other words if you are first in a batch at the time of entry, then as long as you get promoted, you continue to remain first! This is like someone in the army claiming that he should become chief because he got the Sword of Honour at the IMA. Even a Param Vir Chakra does not count for promotion, assuming that you are still alive. In the armed forces, merit is a continuous process - each time a batch is promoted the merit list is redrawn according to your performance in all the previous assignments with additional weightage given not only to the last one but also to your suitability for the next one. Thus if you are a Brigade Commander and found fit to become a Major General, you may not get a division because others have been found better to head a division. That effectively puts an end to your promotion to Lt. General. The compensation package must therefore address all the above issues. In each service, anyone must get the same total compensation by the time he reaches the 'mode rank' of his service. "Mode" is a statistical term it is the value where the maximum number of variables fall.

In the IAS normally everyone reaches Director and in the IPS it is DIG. In the army, given the aforementioned rank and grade rigidities and pyramidal structure, the mode rank cannot exceed Colonel. Thus a Colonel's gross career earnings (not salary scales alone) must be at par with that of a Director. But remember that a Colonel retires at 54, but every babu from peon to Secretary at 60 regardless of performance. Further, it takes 18-20 years to become a Colonel whereas in that time an IAS officer reaches the next higher grade of Joint Secretary, which is considered equal to a Major General. These aspects and others - like postings in non-family stations - must be addressed while fixing the overall pay scales of Colonel and below. Thereafter a Brigadier will be made equal to a Joint Secretary, a Major-General to an Additional Secretary and a Lt. General to a Secretary. The Army Commanders deserve a new rank -Colonel General - and should be above a Secretary but below Cabinet Secretary. The equalization takes place at the level of Cabinet Secretary and Army Chief.

If this is financially a problem I have another solution. Without increasing the armed forces' scales, reduce the scales of the IAS and IPS till they too have 20% shortage.  

Done? Even India 's corruption index will go down.

If the above is accepted in principle, there is a good case to review the number of posts above Colonel. Senior ranks in the armed forces have become devalued with more and more posts being created. But the same pruning exercise is necessary in the IAS and more so in the IPS, where Directors General in some states are re-writing police manuals e.g. one is doing Volume I and another Volume II!

Further the civil services have such facilities as "compulsory wait" i.e. basically a picnic at taxpayers cost. And if you are not promoted or posted where you don't want to go, they seem able to take off on leave with much ease. In the army you will be court-martialled. Also find out how many are on study leave. The country cannot afford this.

Let not someone say that the IAS and IPS exams are tougher and hence the quality of the officers better. An exam at the age of 24 has to be tougher than one at the age of 16. The taxpaying citizen is not interested in your essay/note writing capabilities or whether you know Cleopatra's grandfather.

As a citizen I always see the army being called to hold the pants of the civil services and the police and never the other way round. That's enough proof as to who is really more capable. Also recall the insensitive statements made by the IG Meerut in the Aarushi case and the Home Secretary after the blasts. Further, when the IAS and IPS hopefuls are sleeping, eating and studying, their school mates, who have joined the army, stand vigil on the borders to make it possible for them to do so. Remember that the armed forces can only fight for above the table pay. They can never compete with the civil services and definitely not with the police for the under the table variety.

Finally, there is one supreme national necessity. The political class, not the bureaucracy - which represents the real civil supremacy better become more savvy on matters relating to the armed forces. Till then they are at the mercy of the civil service, who frequently play their own little war games. At ministerial level there are some very specialized departments e.g. Finance, Railways, Security (Home), Foreign and Defence, where split second decisions are necessary. It is always possible to find netas savvy in finance, foreign relations and railways. Security has been addressed in getting a former IPS officer as NSA at the level of a MoS. Is it time that a professional is also brought into the Defence Ministry as MoS? The sooner the better. In fact this will be better than a CoDS, because the armed forces will have someone not constrained by the Army Act or Article 33 of the Constitution. Of course the loudest howls will come from the babus. The netas must realize that a divide and rule policy cannot work where the country's security is concerned. Recall 1962?

Our army, already engaged in activities not core to their functions, including rescuing babies from bore wells, should not have to engage in civil wars over their pay scales. I only hope our defence minister or anyone who would take a reasonable stand for defence forces ever gets to see this article.

It would definitely affect any person with an iota of integrity.....

On OROP Open Letter to Hon'ble PM Mr. Modi

 A copy of open letter from a Veteran is below:

Col Bimal N Bhatia (retd)​      ​

Independent Assessor and Coach at Corporate and Individual Levels

Fauji ke Dil Ki Baat

Dear Mr Modi,

For a long time India (Bharat Varsh) has been wanting a leader who means business. And when you came the country was delighted.

            I’ll come to the point. And the true story at the end will never leave your mind.

            Your pic receiving the Bangladesh Liberation War Honour on behalf of former PM Atal Behai Vajpayee from the Bangladesh President was front paged this morning. Captivating was your speech on that occasion, as it always is.

            You talked about how as a youth activist you had come to Delhi in response to Vajpayee’s call for satyagraha for the liberation of Bangladesh.  You described yourself as ‘one of the crores who wanted this vision to be realized’.

            You then, in your inimitable style, went on to deliver the ultimate message. You did it with the emphasis it deserved, spiritually buoyed by the very meaning of it all. You said : “Bharat ke faujion ne Bangladesh ke lie apna khhoon bahane se pehle ek baar bhi nahin socha.” (Indian Defence Forces personnel unhesitatingly gave their lives for the liberation of Bangladesh.)

            Then you paused, waiting for the applause to die down.

            Just as you were extolling the sacrifices of the Indian Armed Forces, riding high on confidence based on their  virtue which has for years been taken for granted, the same faujis which took part in that historical war were planning a peaceful satyagraha in Delhi to be followed by relay hunger strikes all over India.

            These faujis – some of them just out of their teens – had already packed their haversacks and were poised for battle, ready for the ultimate sacrifice when you decided to come to Delhi for the ‘satyagraha’.

            To press for their decades old demand of the OROP these faujis and many of their seniors who led them in the war on both fronts – Western and Eastern – alongwith thousands of others are now forced into planning this peaceful satyagraha.

            Surely you cannot be unaware of the OROP which you also used as your bugle call to head for Delhi and occupy the PM’s chair.

            The efforts of Indian Ex-Servicemen League (IESL) steered by the indefatigable and now wheelchair bound Lt Col Inderjit Singh, Maj Gen Satbir Singh and  Gp Capt Gandhi with the active support of countless others including Shri Rajeev Chandrashekhar, MP have been consistently stonewalled by our able bureaucrats.

            Shri Chandrashekhar has even refused to accept increased pay and perks of Members of Parliament till the Govt approves OROP. They want it in the form that has been accepted in Parliament without dilution.

            Modiji, I’ll let you in on one true story which you’ll find interesting and apt. Your bureaucrats will not be amused.

            Paramahansa Yogananda recognised as one of the preeminent spiritual figures narrates this in his widely-read autobiography. “Several years after Father had retired on a pension, an accountant from England came to India to examine the books of Bengal - Nagpur Railway. The amazed investigator discovered that father had never applied for overdue bonuses.

            “He did the work of three men!” the accountant told the company. “He has Rs 1,25000 ($ 41,250) owing to him as back compensation.” The treasurer sent Yogananda’s father a cheque for that amount. Yogananda cites this example to convey a spiritual message of evenmindedness in gain or loss like his father. That was in early 1900s.

            Did that make you sit up Modiji?

            Now turn to your bureaucrats and ask them about the Major Dhanapalan case. They should tell you about how in 1986 the babus very cleverly shortchanged the Armed Forces of their rank pay. The simplistic faujis swallowed it unknowingly but many years later one Major Dhanapalan found this out.

            Ask your babus about how the GOI opposed Major Dhanapalan all the way upto the Supreme Court (SC) which ordered that arrears be paid. Any sensible Govt would have paid up other similarly affected officers. Remember the British story?

            But countless others were forced into taking recourse to court and faced similar hurdles – consistent opposition by the GOI. When the SC ordered that arrears be paid with interest the Govt requested that a bulk of the interest be condoned.

            Who created this mess of shortchanging the faujis and lining the coffers of the Govt? Was the responsibility fixed? What was the motive? These are the questions that any sensible person would ask. Modiji did you know about this scam against many faujis?

            Now you be the judge and see why a mess is being made out of the OROP. Many veterans have died waiting for the elusive OROP. Can you ever compensate those who have gone to their maker?

            Never in history have the armed forces done as much for their country’s security while at the same time being consistently neglected as in India. You know about the old saying, ‘Doomed is the King who makes his armies fight for their just pay’.

            One more point. How many politicians and bureaucrats have their sons and daughters in the armed forces?

            Thank you sir for that moving speech about us faujis and our sacrifices.

            It remains our belief that you are a leader who means us well but are just not being given the whole story.

Jai Hind

 

One rank One Pension & the role of Beurocracy

I am slightly digressing from the articles on Ex- Chiefs of the Indian Army to publish this post. 

At the outset, I am not the author of this article. This came to me via email posted by a Vetran Group. But I do share the sentiments expressed therein. 

These are strong sentiments expressed in equally strong words - but let us be honest with ourselves and not shy away from the truth and reality.

 A  look in the Mirror straight into your own eyes is highly recommended after reading this article !

 

 The issue of  “ One Rank One Pension “ has become not only the biggest  INDIAN  joke ( or shall we say SCAM ? )  of the Century  , but  in all likelihood,  maybe  also  a  matter of  immense amusement for  various Armies over the world , especially our neighbours !!

      NOT   MANY OF TODAY’S  GENERATION KNOW THE GENESIS OF THE “ OROP “ CONCEPT . Well, here it is. Till 1973, the Pensions of Armed Forces were 70% of their last pay drawn , while that of the Civilians was 30% of their last pay drawn. THIS  WAS    so as to compensate for the Early Retirement age of Armed Forces as compared to the Civilians . 88% of Military Personnel retire between 35-37 yrs of age, while 92% of balance 12% retired ( then) at 52 yrs   whereas ALL  CIVILIANs retired at  60 ( Yes, SIXTY  !! ) yrs  flat.

                  However, in 1973, duly regularized by the  3rd Pay Commission  under CONGRESS,  the Pensions  of  ALL Govt   Servants were  made EQUAL – viz, that of   Armed Forces REDUCED to 50% , while that of Civilians  ENHANCED to 50%  !!

Two  things  are Note-worthy : --- Firstly, all the 3 CHIEFs  lumped it – God  only  knows  Why  !!  Secondly, the consolation given was  that  the Armed Forces will be compensated by a   NEW/UNIQUE  scheme called “ OROP “  in due course !!

THE   REST, AS THEY SAY, IS  HISTORY  !!

So now you know that it is a matter pending since last 4 Decades!!

Incidentally, there were  other  many more  equally  sad  monstrosities  and insults heaped on Armed forces  - Downgrading  us in the Order of Precedence  is one example. A Police Inspector became a Class I officer while the JCOs continued to be Class II officers  - the list is boundless – ANOMALIES  in each subsequent Pay Commissions only  kept   adding up/accumulating , as the politicians  and  the   beurocrats   became more  overpowering  due to the SHEEPISHNESS of the Chiefs  !!                           

India must be the only country in the world where the Armed Forces ( whether  Retired or Serving ) have to BEG  and FIGHT for their rights and entitlements  ;  Nowhere in the world the Armed Forces   are so Naïve, HELPLESS, GULLIBLE, GOD-FEARING and PLIANT. (( Forget about the Pay and Allowances, we even have to  starve to death for war-like equipment ! )). Is there any known case of any country where their Army has to fall back to the Supreme Court so often?

Is it not  SHAMEFUL  that a Militaryman  ((  rather,  an  ENTIRE  Army, Navy and the AirForce of a Nation  , whether  IN or OUT of Uniform ))  and who is considered to be SO  CALLED “” Brave & Fearless “” has to  plead, beg,  grovel, beseach, wail  and  generally act like the dog in the logo of HMV music (dog on his haunches with folded hands )  for 4  decades  to the Politicians and the Beaurocrats  ?

What a wonderful  set of  cool & calm and “ be  patient “ preaching   Military Leadership we have had  in the past and present too  ( and maybe in future also )  who can afford  to  wait  INNOCENTLY  for  decades, and who watch HELPLESSLY even when EVERY award by the AFT is fought tooth & nail by the Min of Def and Min of Fin right upto the Supreme Court and NOT implemented even after that.   WHO  CAN  FORGET  THE  FAMOUS/INFAMOUS  RANK  PAY  CASE ,  THE  BROADBANDING OF  DISABILITY  PENSION CASE, THE NFSU  CASE  etc?

Even as and when the much  maligned  OROP comes thru, as the Chairman  IESM correctly put across,  we DO   NOT  know as on date as to WHAT IS COOKING OR BEING DOLED OUT,  as the Armed Forces are just not Privy to what is on the Files and what is going on between the MoD and the MoF.  So , in most likelyhood, it may be a similar case like the Rank Pay – be ready to haggle and plead  (  “ submitted for Reconsideration Please “ !! ) and ultimately again go upto Supreme Court again.              

               YESTERDAY’s CASE OF W/ CDR  KARNIK  and  ONE MORE Air Force  OFFICER

HATs  OFF  TO THESE  TWO  OUTSTANDING  AIR FORCE  OFFICER s  WHO  HAVE  DISPLAYED  THE  GUTs  AND   SELF-RESPECT   yesterday  (  by  Defying  and  Daring  the System by way of boycotting a SHAM  function by the CM and the RM )  ~~  THEY  HAVE  DONE  TODAY  , WHAT THE ENTIRE STRENGTH OF 15 Lac  STRONG  ARMED  FORCES  HAVE  NOT  BEEN  ABLE  TO  DO  FOR  40  LONG  Yrs  ~~ that is, display strength of character and real Self-Respect  !!

         Shame  on  our serving Leadership today ( and yesteryears too ) , who cannot look after their own interests ( NFSU etc ) nor fight for the interests of the Veterans , and that           it  finally   took  a  1971 War  Hero and a Veteren   to show strength of Character and Commitment to Cause,  which they lack so Utterly !!

WHY IS  IT  SO  DIFFICULT  FOR  OUR SENIOR  OFFICERS  TO  BELL  A  CAT  ??  WHY  ARE  THE  ARMED  FORCES  SO  SUB-SERVIENT  TO THE  POLITICIANs  &  THE  BEAUROCRATs  ?? IS  IT  TOO MUCH  OF  REGIMENTATION , THAT  MAKES  AN  ARMYMAN  A  DOCILE  PUPPY  ??

 Can somebody give a logical and plausible/palatable answer to this Uncomfortable  Mystery  ??

I think there is a lesson to be learnt from the following glaring 'in-your-face' examples  :

·         MPs/MLAs   &  Judges’   pay  and  allowances  AND  PENSIONs, are proposed and Passed within minutes in the  Parliament and State Assemblies,  and implemented Forthwith – No procedural Hassles come in the way , as being repeatedly claimed by Mr. Parrikar, in case of OROP.

·            Gurjar  community  Leader Col  Bainsala can bring the Govt down  to its knees by merely sitting  on the Rly tracks  for 6 days , forcing  cancellation 39 trains including Both Rajdhanis !!  

·            Even the lowliest of low cadres of the Govt do not accept any nonsense from the powers that be – be it the Bank staff or the Truckwalas – they know how to get their pound of flesh from the Govt .

·         When there was no skin off the noses of even the President of INDIA ( the so called Supreme Commander of Armed Forces )  or the PM or the RM,  even  when the veterans returned their Medals and wrote in blood, does one really think that the brave gesture of 2 gutsy Air Force Officers of Boycotting a function  is really  going to move the Politicians and the wily  Beaurocrats  to tears  ??

·         The PM (Modi) has already fallen embarrassingly  silent on the issue after his lofty announcements from ESM podiums and Siachen, while the RM (Parrikar) has changed his track from giving  specific PDCs/Deadlines  to mumbling vague statements like " no specific time-frames can be stated as it is a very COMPLEX  ADMINISTRATIVE  PROCESS Can  somebody !!  ---   It appears that FINALLY  the Nickel has dropped - they too have realised that  even they are at the total mercy of the Wily Beaurocrats - a MONSTER created  and nurtured by the Nehru's Congress  !!

So folks, the  WRITING IS VERY  LOUD & CLEAR ON THE WALL -- One has to be either Totally  Blind or in complete  DENIAL  MODE  Not  to  read  the Reality.

In my opinion, a serious rethink is required --  a paradigm shift  from “passive colonial type  expressions in Victorian English  and  docile tokens  of  gestures “   to  “ more active  and forceful  methods “  of  nudging and waking up our Lords & Masters . After all, YOURs as well as that of the entire Armed Forces'  AAN,  BAAN  &  SHAAN  is at stake.

NOTE - I AM SURE EVERY ONE READING THIS WILL AGREE THAT IT IS A UNIVERSAL FACT THAT ALL OVER THE GLOBE AFTER THE MARRIAGE KHUSH KHABRI IS EXPECTED AND EVEN DELIVERED AFTER NINE MONTHS.

Inter Service & Intra Service Rivalry

The inter-service and intra-service rivalry is a legacy left by the British Army not only in the Indian Armed Forces but also in most of the other Colonial Armed Forces like Pakistan etc. However unlike in Pakistan where its Army calls the shot, in the Indian context, none of the three wings have the final say in policies; that is in the realm of the politicians and bureaucrats so much so that even the Chief of any of the wings has no power to veto an unwanted promotion or an unwarranted placement ordered by the MoD. The Indian bureaucrats have fine tuned the art of playing one service against the other (who even otherwise are already afflicted by ego problems and uncalled for partiality to own service) so much , that even after a decade after the acceptance of the necessity for having a Combined Chief of Staff , the implementation has been given a silent burial!

The British Legacy:

In between the end of the First World War and the start of the Second, the induction of the military equipment in the British Armed Forces were partly determined by a number of curious military attitudes. These centred particularly around three instruments of warfare:tanks,planes and horses.

In spite of incontrovertible evidence regarding the massive production of tanks in Germany and Hitler's preparation for the next war, successive Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff between 1918 and 1939, did not exert themselves to mechanise the Army. Some were openly and actively obstructing any idea of tank warfare. For example when Maj Gen Fuller , an early protagonist of mechanization, won a Gold Medal for his book, he was castigated by successive Chiefs of Staff. Liddel Hart, produced a number of articles and books on mechanization. When he submitted his competitive essay on 'Mechanization of the Army', it was rejected in favour another entry titled 'Limitations of the Tank'. However, the German, who got a copy of Hart's essay were so much enthused that Panzer General Guderian mad it a compulsory reading for all the German General Staff! Sir Philip Chetwode, Commander-in-Chief India, even after the proven success of tanks in the North West Frontier, declared that the Army in India would be unlikely to adopt tanks for a very long time and even if it did , it would only be to keep the momentum of horsed Cavalry.

Between 1914 and 1918 aeroplanes were put to use for bombing sorties, ground support and reconnaissance by the British as well the Germans with considerable success. It was obvious that air superiority will be a decisive factor in any future wars. The private industry was developing more and more powerful aircraft with improvement in performance and safety. However the Army and the Admiralty evinced little enthusiasm and having a new junior service in the form of RAF was complete anathema. The usual rivalry between the Army and navy were forgotten due to their mutual dislike of the new service. The opposition to tanks by the Army and to the aeroplanes by the Navy ( who were more vociferous), has to be viewed in the context of their fear that their domains might get curtailed by these new technological developments. Added to that was the fear budget cuts in the areas they were comfortable with.

In 1935 worsening elations with Italy had put the British fleet in Malta at serious risk from sudden air attack. When this fear was expressed by Liddle Hart, Sir Philip Chetwode wrote “ You are evidently crammed up by the Air propaganda.. There is only one way in which Air can win a war and that is by bombing women and children; and that will never bring a great nation to its knees. You know that the Navy laughs at the Air now. They have got protected decks and with their 'blisters' and multiple machine guns and multiple anti-aircraft guns , they do not fear them in the slightest.” However, the British abandoned Malta . Only six years later the British saw , to their horror, what Air could do and did at Pearl harbour!

The fall of Singapore is a case study on the aspects of inter service rivalry.

Between early December 1941 and mid February 1942, the 'impregnable' fortress of Singapore fell lock,stock and barrel into the hands of the Japanese. It was so swift that even the Japanese were surprised by the ease, speed and enormity of their success. Analysing the causes for the fall of Singapore , Norman Dixon in his book has to say this. The loss of Singapore had its its origin in much earlier events. In 1925, there was a protracted and acrimonious argument between the Army,Navy and the Air Force Chiefs as to how Singapore should be defended. Army and navy pressed for fortifiications and deployment of heavy guns to repel the attack from seaward. The RAF advocated a large force of aircraft to repel any attack before it could come within the range of the island. Army and Navy won their case at the expense of their junior service. Heavy fixed armaments became the order of the day. The Army was of the view that Japanese would not be able to bring their tanks through the impenetrable jungles of the Malay Peninsula. The bitter inter-service quarrel resulted in an almost total lack of co-ordination between the services so much so that the Headquarters of Army, Navy and Air Force were sites as far apart as possible. RAF even began constructing airfields without consulting the Army who were responsible for defending them.

As far Navy who were the protagonists of sea facing fixed heavy guns for its sole protection and were against the deployment of Air Force, found that there were only thirty rounds of ammunition for each of the guns enough to last one round per day for a month! Added to that was the induction of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse rushed to Singapore at the last moment under command od Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Despite strong warnings that he would not be getting any fighter protection from the Air Force, he was too soon off with his two ships in search of trouble. Without informing Singapore he decided to 'go in and help' in the reported attack on Kuantan. His ships , spotted by Japanese aircraft were torpedoed and sunk with a total loss of about 900 officers and men.

Major General Gordon Bennett , commanding the 8^th Australian Division was not even prepared to discuss the nedd for putting anti-tank defences in the North in spite of repeated pleadings by Brigadier Simson, the Chief engineer. Bennett wrote ' Malay Command sent Brigadier Simson to discuss with me the creation of anti-tank obstacles for use on the road... Personally I have little time for these obstacles.. preferring to stop and destroy tanks with anti-tank weapons.' When the first tanks appeared to the surprise of the British troops who have been all along told that the Japanese tanks could never operate in the jungle country such as Malaya, the British had not a single tank to oppose them. Japanese tanks moves easily between the spacious rows between the rubber trees.

The role played by General Percival , the General Officer Commanding Malaya is slated for in the post titled “Military Incompetency” later on.

The Indian Scenario:

The Indian Armed Forces suffer equally from the malaise of both inter-service and intra-service rivalry, competition and one-upmanship. As opposed to the British Armed Forces, Indian Navy and Air Force are of more or less equal vintage. Though Indian Army is centuries older than both of them, they suffer from an inferiority complex. One may rather put it in another way that both Navy and Air Force display a superiority complex. This mind set was earlier exclusive to the Officers cadre but has now unfortunately percolated to other ranks as well.

The first Indian to become Chief of the Army staff was in the rank of General was KM Kariappa in January 1949 .The first Indian to become the Chief of Naval Staff was RD Katari in the rank of Vice Admiral in April 1958 almost a decade later. The first Indian to become the Chief of Air Staff was S.Mukerjea in the rank of Air Marshal in the year 1954. Till 1955, all were designated as Commander -in-Chief of their respective services. For about six years the Chief of Air Staff and for about nine year the chief of naval Staff were of a rank lower than that of the Army though in the warrant of precedence they enjoyed the same status. There were many Army Commanders who were seniors in service and rank as well but did not enjoy the privileges attached to C-in_C of Navy and Air force as the appointment was then called.

Prior to starting of Joint Services wing for the Army, Navy and Air Force Officers and their subsequent commissioning, there were only a handful of Indians in the RIN or RIAF where as there were very many Indian Officers in the British Indian Army who were holding King's Commission and served in major theatres of war in Europe, the far east as well as in the subcontinent. Even after the start of the JSW in Dehradun, the intake into Army was many times that to Navy and Air Force. This apart, while the cadets for the Army wing were trained in India , those of the Navy and Air Force were sent to England for further training and grant of commission. The superiority complex among the Naval and Air Force officers therefore started from their cadet days as well and this continues even to this day at the National defence Academy as some how the cadets of these two wings feel that they are some one special for having gained entry to the wings whose intake is far less as compared to Army. Secondly the promotion prospects and the speed of promotion in the Navy and Air Force were much higher and faster than in the Army. It was not improbable for an Army Officer of the rank of major or Lt. Col to meet his course mate at NDA in the equivalent rank of Colonel in the navy and Air Force. Thirdly while the Army officers had to put in decades of service in non-family stations such service conditions are rare in Navy and Air Force. While Army station is forced to accept peace condition where they are stationed while there are no adequete( leave alone authorised) married accommodation, education facilities for children etc. an Air Force Station or Naval Station is not accepted as operational unless all these infrastructures are fully met. For example in a station like Pathankot, Air Force Station will have 100% authorised accommodation for all its personnel, infrastructure for their offices and work areas where as the Army stationed there may not have even 20% of what is authorised but still accept it as a peace station. The Army therefore feels that they are always on low priority in terms of resource allocation not only for their military hardware but also for other basic requirements. In spite of the fact that the Air Force is holding 10% of the manpower , and the Navy even half of that, the number ratio of officers in the higher equivalent ranks of Brigadiers and above in the Navy and Air Force to total number of Officers in these wings are much higher as compared to Army.

At the time of partition, the Indian Army had total of 88 Infantry battalions , 12 regiments of Armoured Corps. The Indian Navy had 19 assorted warships comprising Frigates, Sloops, Corvettes,Minesweepers and seventeen assorted other vessels including Survey Ships,a tanker and motor launchers. The Air Force had Seven Fighter Squadrons and two Transport squadrons. With acute shortage due to meagre budget allocation for the Defence Budget during the first three five year plans, there was a more or less a fierce competition among the Army, Navy and Air Headquarters in sharing this allocation. The total defence expenditure in 1950-51 was just Rs.168 Crores and in 1960-61 it was Rs. 281 Crores barely managing to cater for pay, pension and inflation. ( Even after the outcry for defence preparedness after the Chinese aggression in 1962 , the increase in annual budget allocation for defence did not touch even 3% despite the fact that the rupee was devalued by more than 57% in June 1966 and most of the defence procurement were from foreign countries) There was no Commander-in-Chief ( as the post was abolished) who had the power to prioritise the meagre budget allocation for procurement of hardware among the three wings. This anomaly gave the bureaucrats in the MoD especially the Defence Secretary to decide on the interse priority among the three wings of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately , the Chiefs of the three wings rather than projecting a combined front, started wooing the bureaucrats , for getting a better share compared to the other. This was the start of the ascendancy of the say of bureaucrats over the Chiefs of the three wings on matters of defence policy as well. (The state of affairs continues to this day and in fact much worsened so much so even promotion to the rank of Major General or its equivalent is interfered with bureaucrats and politicians on this aspect a separate post in this blog later) . The neglect of the Armed Forces especially that of the Army had a telling during the 62 and 65 Wars. We shall presently see the role of Navy and Air Force till the 1965 war with Pakistan. The material for the subsequent paragraphs have been culled from various sources and most importantly from the official history published by MoD which is in public domain and available in the internet.

Neither during the 1947 conflict with Pakistan, nor during the Hyderabad action Navy had any major role to play. During the Goa action , Indian Navy did play a major role against very feeble opposition and the war was over in a matter of two days. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was largely fought over the Himalayas and the Navy had only a defensive role in the war. Indian Naval activity in the Pakistani War of 1965 largely involved coastal patrols. During the war, the Pakistani Navy attacked the Indian coastal city of Dwarka, although there were no military resources in the area. While this attack was insignificant, naval resources were deployed to patrol the coast and to deter further bombardment.

As far air force, during the 1947 conflict ,no air-to-air encounters took place between the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Pakistan Air Force. Indian Air Force and civilian aircraft were extensively used for air lifting the troops, weapons and evacuation of casualties. Air Force did provide ground support by strafing the enemy positions, their concentration areas etc. During the Hyderabad action , the Indian Air Force was involved in providing close air support to the advancing troops. They also flew a few strafing missions against the airfield at Hakimpet and later strafed a parade of Razakars at Gulbarga. The operations were on a small scale and of negligble consequence for the Army operations. In the Goa operations, the Air Force was tasked for the following: the destruction of Goa’s lone airfield in Dabolim, without causing damage to the terminal building and other airport facilities ,destruction of the wireless station at Bambolim, Goa,denial of airfields at Daman and Diu and support to advancing ground troops. In the absence of any Portuguese air presence, Portuguese ground based anti-aircraft units attempted to offer resistance to the Indian raids, but were overwhelmed and quickly silenced, leaving complete air superiority. In 1965, in the Rann of Kutch episode, the Official history published by the Ministry of Defence narrates “ At 11.40 A.M, on 14 April ( 1965), Air Marshal Asghar Khan, C-in-C Pakistan Air Force , rang up his Indian Counterpart, Air marshal Arjan Singh, to suggest that the aircraft of both the countries should not fly over the 'disputed' Kanjarkot area , as it might escalate fighting. He also suggested that the fighter and bomber aircraft of both the Air Forces should not fly with in 16 Km of the border. The Indian Air Chief accepted the proposal but added that the Indian helicopters and transport aircraft would be used for supply purpose.

When a full fledged Armoured thrust was launched in the Chamb sector, Gen. Choudhury along with Air Marshal Arjan Singh met Defence Minister Chavan and the Defence Secretary PVR Rao at around 1600 hrs on 1^st September for permission to use IAF. After the go ahead was given IAF came into action. On 2^nd September IAF aircraft were mainly used for fighter sweeps. On 3^rd September they decided to give for the PR sorties against Pak sabres. Migs were introduced only on 4^th September. While the IAF was brought into battle only after 1^st September without any previous detailed planning either for ground support or for destruction of enemy strongholds, PAF had detailed plan to attack vital air fields in India by as early as June 65. This was code named their War Plan No 6. On 06 September, by 1300 hrs. the plan was ordered to be put into action by the concerned PAF units . According to the plan. Eight F-86 successfully raided Pathankot airbase and destroyed two Mig-21, 6 Mysteres, one Gnat and and one C-119 packet. Two Gnats and a Mystere were damaged. Halwara was attacked at 1840 hrs by four F-86 and shot down two Hunters who were capping the air field. Amritsar radar Station was attacked thrice without much damage. Jamnagar base was raided six times . Four Vampires were damaged. There was no much anti air craft flak from the Indian side or any fighter interception against them , so much so that some cres flew as many as three missions against Jamnagar air base in a period of three hours. F-86 mission against Adampur was disrupted by four Hunters of IAF . IAF lost a Mig-21 during the night raid by PAF. IAF retaliated with counter-air strikes over air bases at Sargodha, Chhota Sargodha, Rahwali, Chander, Gujrat, Bhagatnwala,Chaklala and Pasrur. No aircrafts were found in any of these airfields. They could destroy a radar unit at Rahwali and ignite a fuel dump at Chklala. As per Official records in the Indian Army, the ground support provided by IAF during its offensive in Punjab against vigorous PAF ground attack was totally lacking. John Fricker has also corroborated this : “Incredibly, the Indian offensive struggled on without any form of air support and the IAF did not challenge the repeated ground attack sorties flown without loss by the PAF.” Between 8 September to 22 September most of IAF and PAF engagements were to attack the air bases of each other and the ensuing air battles. While IAF claims that their strike at Khemkaran sector blunted the Pakistani armour thrust, it is only partly true. As summarised in the official history of the war by MoD, there were certain clear deficiencies in the control of IAF operations. Air Defence and Offensive support operations were controlled by two separate organisations. These were AD Area and Advance HQ and Western Air Command respectively. In the initial stages of the war , the aim of IAF was to achieve favouarble air superiority. Since they failed to achieve this , they devoted most of their effort for their own defence and gave a low priority for offensive ground support to the Army. CAPs and escorts used up almost two thirds of entire Air effort. Also, ground attack air crafts for close air support to the Army needed fighter escorts which could not be dovetailed with the requirement of Air Defence due to limited availability and dual control by different organisations with different aims. Due to this offensive effort could not be sub-allotted By Air HQ to Tactical Air Centres located with the Corps Headquarters. When a request is passed on to a Station Commander, who also would get orders from Air HQs, WAC for various other assignments, the request from TAC forwarded the previous evening would be given the lower priority if at all aircraft are available by next morning! No wonder Army is now demanding attack helicopters to be given to Army Aviation so that they get guaranteed and responsive offensive air support.( especially after their experience while dealing with Air Force during Kargil Ops- the details of which are available in the public domain). The Chief of Air Staff recently compared this legitimate requirement of the Army to Coast Guard requesting for submarines! I wonder how these Chiefs will conduct a coordinated future war! They all talk of so called 'Network Centric Operations' what ever that may mean. It is exasperating.

The case for Attack Helicopters integral to the Army :
After much criticisms, hear burning among the Army and Air Force, the MoD has accepted the validity of Army having its own wing of attack helicopters. But the justification for the same could not be presented by the Army in the past in a cogent and convincing manner by the Army HQ. The reason for the same lies mainly at the door steps of many of the Corps and Army Commanders. It is borne out of past experience and records of the past wars as given in the official history published by MoD itself, that the Indian  Air Force was prepared to provide 'close  Air Support' for the Army operations only when they were able to achieve ' favourable Air Situation'. Their first priority had been and will always be to safeguard their own  air combat potential and air defence of own airfields. Army operations, especially those which are swift and fast using mechanized forces  will have to wait till the Air Force is able to achieve 'favourable Air situation'. Can the timing of the Army operations wait for such uncertain close air support? In today's technological scenario with fast communication, satellite coverage of operational areas ,element of surprise will be lost giving adequate warning of intentions to the Army. More importantly plum opportunity to exploit  a situation may be lost by the Army. It is therefore all the more essential that the Army has at least assured close air support for its mobile forces to not only defend and protect its mobile columns but also attack enemy concentration areas. Though this was a well known and admitted fact, Army could never convince the MoD for having its integral Armed Helicopters. Firstly, the Air Force was able to convince the MoD on extra financial outlay on maintenance, training and infrastructure needed for the Army in having its own integral flights. Secondly and more cynically, they could produce various official and demi-official documents written by various Corps and Army Commanders glorifying the Air Support provided during various Training exercises and War games. One should also note that during these war games and major exercises there is no physical threat from the enemy Air Force and ' favourable air situation' was an assured 'Term of reference'. In most cases it was also because the Air Force obliged these Commanders a few  trips to oversee the progress of the exercise  and  some times  joy rides in their helicopters.