Inter Service & Intra Service Rivalry

The inter-service and intra-service rivalry is a legacy left by the British Army not only in the Indian Armed Forces but also in most of the other Colonial Armed Forces like Pakistan etc. However unlike in Pakistan where its Army calls the shot, in the Indian context, none of the three wings have the final say in policies; that is in the realm of the politicians and bureaucrats so much so that even the Chief of any of the wings has no power to veto an unwanted promotion or an unwarranted placement ordered by the MoD. The Indian bureaucrats have fine tuned the art of playing one service against the other (who even otherwise are already afflicted by ego problems and uncalled for partiality to own service) so much , that even after a decade after the acceptance of the necessity for having a Combined Chief of Staff , the implementation has been given a silent burial!

The British Legacy:

In between the end of the First World War and the start of the Second, the induction of the military equipment in the British Armed Forces were partly determined by a number of curious military attitudes. These centred particularly around three instruments of warfare:tanks,planes and horses.

In spite of incontrovertible evidence regarding the massive production of tanks in Germany and Hitler's preparation for the next war, successive Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff between 1918 and 1939, did not exert themselves to mechanise the Army. Some were openly and actively obstructing any idea of tank warfare. For example when Maj Gen Fuller , an early protagonist of mechanization, won a Gold Medal for his book, he was castigated by successive Chiefs of Staff. Liddel Hart, produced a number of articles and books on mechanization. When he submitted his competitive essay on 'Mechanization of the Army', it was rejected in favour another entry titled 'Limitations of the Tank'. However, the German, who got a copy of Hart's essay were so much enthused that Panzer General Guderian mad it a compulsory reading for all the German General Staff! Sir Philip Chetwode, Commander-in-Chief India, even after the proven success of tanks in the North West Frontier, declared that the Army in India would be unlikely to adopt tanks for a very long time and even if it did , it would only be to keep the momentum of horsed Cavalry.

Between 1914 and 1918 aeroplanes were put to use for bombing sorties, ground support and reconnaissance by the British as well the Germans with considerable success. It was obvious that air superiority will be a decisive factor in any future wars. The private industry was developing more and more powerful aircraft with improvement in performance and safety. However the Army and the Admiralty evinced little enthusiasm and having a new junior service in the form of RAF was complete anathema. The usual rivalry between the Army and navy were forgotten due to their mutual dislike of the new service. The opposition to tanks by the Army and to the aeroplanes by the Navy ( who were more vociferous), has to be viewed in the context of their fear that their domains might get curtailed by these new technological developments. Added to that was the fear budget cuts in the areas they were comfortable with.

In 1935 worsening elations with Italy had put the British fleet in Malta at serious risk from sudden air attack. When this fear was expressed by Liddle Hart, Sir Philip Chetwode wrote “ You are evidently crammed up by the Air propaganda.. There is only one way in which Air can win a war and that is by bombing women and children; and that will never bring a great nation to its knees. You know that the Navy laughs at the Air now. They have got protected decks and with their 'blisters' and multiple machine guns and multiple anti-aircraft guns , they do not fear them in the slightest.” However, the British abandoned Malta . Only six years later the British saw , to their horror, what Air could do and did at Pearl harbour!

The fall of Singapore is a case study on the aspects of inter service rivalry.

Between early December 1941 and mid February 1942, the 'impregnable' fortress of Singapore fell lock,stock and barrel into the hands of the Japanese. It was so swift that even the Japanese were surprised by the ease, speed and enormity of their success. Analysing the causes for the fall of Singapore , Norman Dixon in his book has to say this. The loss of Singapore had its its origin in much earlier events. In 1925, there was a protracted and acrimonious argument between the Army,Navy and the Air Force Chiefs as to how Singapore should be defended. Army and navy pressed for fortifiications and deployment of heavy guns to repel the attack from seaward. The RAF advocated a large force of aircraft to repel any attack before it could come within the range of the island. Army and Navy won their case at the expense of their junior service. Heavy fixed armaments became the order of the day. The Army was of the view that Japanese would not be able to bring their tanks through the impenetrable jungles of the Malay Peninsula. The bitter inter-service quarrel resulted in an almost total lack of co-ordination between the services so much so that the Headquarters of Army, Navy and Air Force were sites as far apart as possible. RAF even began constructing airfields without consulting the Army who were responsible for defending them.

As far Navy who were the protagonists of sea facing fixed heavy guns for its sole protection and were against the deployment of Air Force, found that there were only thirty rounds of ammunition for each of the guns enough to last one round per day for a month! Added to that was the induction of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse rushed to Singapore at the last moment under command od Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Despite strong warnings that he would not be getting any fighter protection from the Air Force, he was too soon off with his two ships in search of trouble. Without informing Singapore he decided to 'go in and help' in the reported attack on Kuantan. His ships , spotted by Japanese aircraft were torpedoed and sunk with a total loss of about 900 officers and men.

Major General Gordon Bennett , commanding the 8^th Australian Division was not even prepared to discuss the nedd for putting anti-tank defences in the North in spite of repeated pleadings by Brigadier Simson, the Chief engineer. Bennett wrote ' Malay Command sent Brigadier Simson to discuss with me the creation of anti-tank obstacles for use on the road... Personally I have little time for these obstacles.. preferring to stop and destroy tanks with anti-tank weapons.' When the first tanks appeared to the surprise of the British troops who have been all along told that the Japanese tanks could never operate in the jungle country such as Malaya, the British had not a single tank to oppose them. Japanese tanks moves easily between the spacious rows between the rubber trees.

The role played by General Percival , the General Officer Commanding Malaya is slated for in the post titled “Military Incompetency” later on.

The Indian Scenario:

The Indian Armed Forces suffer equally from the malaise of both inter-service and intra-service rivalry, competition and one-upmanship. As opposed to the British Armed Forces, Indian Navy and Air Force are of more or less equal vintage. Though Indian Army is centuries older than both of them, they suffer from an inferiority complex. One may rather put it in another way that both Navy and Air Force display a superiority complex. This mind set was earlier exclusive to the Officers cadre but has now unfortunately percolated to other ranks as well.

The first Indian to become Chief of the Army staff was in the rank of General was KM Kariappa in January 1949 .The first Indian to become the Chief of Naval Staff was RD Katari in the rank of Vice Admiral in April 1958 almost a decade later. The first Indian to become the Chief of Air Staff was S.Mukerjea in the rank of Air Marshal in the year 1954. Till 1955, all were designated as Commander -in-Chief of their respective services. For about six years the Chief of Air Staff and for about nine year the chief of naval Staff were of a rank lower than that of the Army though in the warrant of precedence they enjoyed the same status. There were many Army Commanders who were seniors in service and rank as well but did not enjoy the privileges attached to C-in_C of Navy and Air force as the appointment was then called.

Prior to starting of Joint Services wing for the Army, Navy and Air Force Officers and their subsequent commissioning, there were only a handful of Indians in the RIN or RIAF where as there were very many Indian Officers in the British Indian Army who were holding King's Commission and served in major theatres of war in Europe, the far east as well as in the subcontinent. Even after the start of the JSW in Dehradun, the intake into Army was many times that to Navy and Air Force. This apart, while the cadets for the Army wing were trained in India , those of the Navy and Air Force were sent to England for further training and grant of commission. The superiority complex among the Naval and Air Force officers therefore started from their cadet days as well and this continues even to this day at the National defence Academy as some how the cadets of these two wings feel that they are some one special for having gained entry to the wings whose intake is far less as compared to Army. Secondly the promotion prospects and the speed of promotion in the Navy and Air Force were much higher and faster than in the Army. It was not improbable for an Army Officer of the rank of major or Lt. Col to meet his course mate at NDA in the equivalent rank of Colonel in the navy and Air Force. Thirdly while the Army officers had to put in decades of service in non-family stations such service conditions are rare in Navy and Air Force. While Army station is forced to accept peace condition where they are stationed while there are no adequete( leave alone authorised) married accommodation, education facilities for children etc. an Air Force Station or Naval Station is not accepted as operational unless all these infrastructures are fully met. For example in a station like Pathankot, Air Force Station will have 100% authorised accommodation for all its personnel, infrastructure for their offices and work areas where as the Army stationed there may not have even 20% of what is authorised but still accept it as a peace station. The Army therefore feels that they are always on low priority in terms of resource allocation not only for their military hardware but also for other basic requirements. In spite of the fact that the Air Force is holding 10% of the manpower , and the Navy even half of that, the number ratio of officers in the higher equivalent ranks of Brigadiers and above in the Navy and Air Force to total number of Officers in these wings are much higher as compared to Army.

At the time of partition, the Indian Army had total of 88 Infantry battalions , 12 regiments of Armoured Corps. The Indian Navy had 19 assorted warships comprising Frigates, Sloops, Corvettes,Minesweepers and seventeen assorted other vessels including Survey Ships,a tanker and motor launchers. The Air Force had Seven Fighter Squadrons and two Transport squadrons. With acute shortage due to meagre budget allocation for the Defence Budget during the first three five year plans, there was a more or less a fierce competition among the Army, Navy and Air Headquarters in sharing this allocation. The total defence expenditure in 1950-51 was just Rs.168 Crores and in 1960-61 it was Rs. 281 Crores barely managing to cater for pay, pension and inflation. ( Even after the outcry for defence preparedness after the Chinese aggression in 1962 , the increase in annual budget allocation for defence did not touch even 3% despite the fact that the rupee was devalued by more than 57% in June 1966 and most of the defence procurement were from foreign countries) There was no Commander-in-Chief ( as the post was abolished) who had the power to prioritise the meagre budget allocation for procurement of hardware among the three wings. This anomaly gave the bureaucrats in the MoD especially the Defence Secretary to decide on the interse priority among the three wings of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately , the Chiefs of the three wings rather than projecting a combined front, started wooing the bureaucrats , for getting a better share compared to the other. This was the start of the ascendancy of the say of bureaucrats over the Chiefs of the three wings on matters of defence policy as well. (The state of affairs continues to this day and in fact much worsened so much so even promotion to the rank of Major General or its equivalent is interfered with bureaucrats and politicians on this aspect a separate post in this blog later) . The neglect of the Armed Forces especially that of the Army had a telling during the 62 and 65 Wars. We shall presently see the role of Navy and Air Force till the 1965 war with Pakistan. The material for the subsequent paragraphs have been culled from various sources and most importantly from the official history published by MoD which is in public domain and available in the internet.

Neither during the 1947 conflict with Pakistan, nor during the Hyderabad action Navy had any major role to play. During the Goa action , Indian Navy did play a major role against very feeble opposition and the war was over in a matter of two days. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was largely fought over the Himalayas and the Navy had only a defensive role in the war. Indian Naval activity in the Pakistani War of 1965 largely involved coastal patrols. During the war, the Pakistani Navy attacked the Indian coastal city of Dwarka, although there were no military resources in the area. While this attack was insignificant, naval resources were deployed to patrol the coast and to deter further bombardment.

As far air force, during the 1947 conflict ,no air-to-air encounters took place between the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Pakistan Air Force. Indian Air Force and civilian aircraft were extensively used for air lifting the troops, weapons and evacuation of casualties. Air Force did provide ground support by strafing the enemy positions, their concentration areas etc. During the Hyderabad action , the Indian Air Force was involved in providing close air support to the advancing troops. They also flew a few strafing missions against the airfield at Hakimpet and later strafed a parade of Razakars at Gulbarga. The operations were on a small scale and of negligble consequence for the Army operations. In the Goa operations, the Air Force was tasked for the following: the destruction of Goa’s lone airfield in Dabolim, without causing damage to the terminal building and other airport facilities ,destruction of the wireless station at Bambolim, Goa,denial of airfields at Daman and Diu and support to advancing ground troops. In the absence of any Portuguese air presence, Portuguese ground based anti-aircraft units attempted to offer resistance to the Indian raids, but were overwhelmed and quickly silenced, leaving complete air superiority. In 1965, in the Rann of Kutch episode, the Official history published by the Ministry of Defence narrates “ At 11.40 A.M, on 14 April ( 1965), Air Marshal Asghar Khan, C-in-C Pakistan Air Force , rang up his Indian Counterpart, Air marshal Arjan Singh, to suggest that the aircraft of both the countries should not fly over the 'disputed' Kanjarkot area , as it might escalate fighting. He also suggested that the fighter and bomber aircraft of both the Air Forces should not fly with in 16 Km of the border. The Indian Air Chief accepted the proposal but added that the Indian helicopters and transport aircraft would be used for supply purpose.

When a full fledged Armoured thrust was launched in the Chamb sector, Gen. Choudhury along with Air Marshal Arjan Singh met Defence Minister Chavan and the Defence Secretary PVR Rao at around 1600 hrs on 1^st September for permission to use IAF. After the go ahead was given IAF came into action. On 2^nd September IAF aircraft were mainly used for fighter sweeps. On 3^rd September they decided to give for the PR sorties against Pak sabres. Migs were introduced only on 4^th September. While the IAF was brought into battle only after 1^st September without any previous detailed planning either for ground support or for destruction of enemy strongholds, PAF had detailed plan to attack vital air fields in India by as early as June 65. This was code named their War Plan No 6. On 06 September, by 1300 hrs. the plan was ordered to be put into action by the concerned PAF units . According to the plan. Eight F-86 successfully raided Pathankot airbase and destroyed two Mig-21, 6 Mysteres, one Gnat and and one C-119 packet. Two Gnats and a Mystere were damaged. Halwara was attacked at 1840 hrs by four F-86 and shot down two Hunters who were capping the air field. Amritsar radar Station was attacked thrice without much damage. Jamnagar base was raided six times . Four Vampires were damaged. There was no much anti air craft flak from the Indian side or any fighter interception against them , so much so that some cres flew as many as three missions against Jamnagar air base in a period of three hours. F-86 mission against Adampur was disrupted by four Hunters of IAF . IAF lost a Mig-21 during the night raid by PAF. IAF retaliated with counter-air strikes over air bases at Sargodha, Chhota Sargodha, Rahwali, Chander, Gujrat, Bhagatnwala,Chaklala and Pasrur. No aircrafts were found in any of these airfields. They could destroy a radar unit at Rahwali and ignite a fuel dump at Chklala. As per Official records in the Indian Army, the ground support provided by IAF during its offensive in Punjab against vigorous PAF ground attack was totally lacking. John Fricker has also corroborated this : “Incredibly, the Indian offensive struggled on without any form of air support and the IAF did not challenge the repeated ground attack sorties flown without loss by the PAF.” Between 8 September to 22 September most of IAF and PAF engagements were to attack the air bases of each other and the ensuing air battles. While IAF claims that their strike at Khemkaran sector blunted the Pakistani armour thrust, it is only partly true. As summarised in the official history of the war by MoD, there were certain clear deficiencies in the control of IAF operations. Air Defence and Offensive support operations were controlled by two separate organisations. These were AD Area and Advance HQ and Western Air Command respectively. In the initial stages of the war , the aim of IAF was to achieve favouarble air superiority. Since they failed to achieve this , they devoted most of their effort for their own defence and gave a low priority for offensive ground support to the Army. CAPs and escorts used up almost two thirds of entire Air effort. Also, ground attack air crafts for close air support to the Army needed fighter escorts which could not be dovetailed with the requirement of Air Defence due to limited availability and dual control by different organisations with different aims. Due to this offensive effort could not be sub-allotted By Air HQ to Tactical Air Centres located with the Corps Headquarters. When a request is passed on to a Station Commander, who also would get orders from Air HQs, WAC for various other assignments, the request from TAC forwarded the previous evening would be given the lower priority if at all aircraft are available by next morning! No wonder Army is now demanding attack helicopters to be given to Army Aviation so that they get guaranteed and responsive offensive air support.( especially after their experience while dealing with Air Force during Kargil Ops- the details of which are available in the public domain). The Chief of Air Staff recently compared this legitimate requirement of the Army to Coast Guard requesting for submarines! I wonder how these Chiefs will conduct a coordinated future war! They all talk of so called 'Network Centric Operations' what ever that may mean. It is exasperating.

The case for Attack Helicopters integral to the Army :
After much criticisms, hear burning among the Army and Air Force, the MoD has accepted the validity of Army having its own wing of attack helicopters. But the justification for the same could not be presented by the Army in the past in a cogent and convincing manner by the Army HQ. The reason for the same lies mainly at the door steps of many of the Corps and Army Commanders. It is borne out of past experience and records of the past wars as given in the official history published by MoD itself, that the Indian  Air Force was prepared to provide 'close  Air Support' for the Army operations only when they were able to achieve ' favourable Air Situation'. Their first priority had been and will always be to safeguard their own  air combat potential and air defence of own airfields. Army operations, especially those which are swift and fast using mechanized forces  will have to wait till the Air Force is able to achieve 'favourable Air situation'. Can the timing of the Army operations wait for such uncertain close air support? In today's technological scenario with fast communication, satellite coverage of operational areas ,element of surprise will be lost giving adequate warning of intentions to the Army. More importantly plum opportunity to exploit  a situation may be lost by the Army. It is therefore all the more essential that the Army has at least assured close air support for its mobile forces to not only defend and protect its mobile columns but also attack enemy concentration areas. Though this was a well known and admitted fact, Army could never convince the MoD for having its integral Armed Helicopters. Firstly, the Air Force was able to convince the MoD on extra financial outlay on maintenance, training and infrastructure needed for the Army in having its own integral flights. Secondly and more cynically, they could produce various official and demi-official documents written by various Corps and Army Commanders glorifying the Air Support provided during various Training exercises and War games. One should also note that during these war games and major exercises there is no physical threat from the enemy Air Force and ' favourable air situation' was an assured 'Term of reference'. In most cases it was also because the Air Force obliged these Commanders a few  trips to oversee the progress of the exercise  and  some times  joy rides in their helicopters.