Inter Service & Intra Service Rivalry

The inter-service and intra-service rivalry is a legacy left by the British Army not only in the Indian Armed Forces but also in most of the other Colonial Armed Forces like Pakistan etc. However unlike in Pakistan where its Army calls the shot, in the Indian context, none of the three wings have the final say in policies; that is in the realm of the politicians and bureaucrats so much so that even the Chief of any of the wings has no power to veto an unwanted promotion or an unwarranted placement ordered by the MoD. The Indian bureaucrats have fine tuned the art of playing one service against the other (who even otherwise are already afflicted by ego problems and uncalled for partiality to own service) so much , that even after a decade after the acceptance of the necessity for having a Combined Chief of Staff , the implementation has been given a silent burial!

The British Legacy:

In between the end of the First World War and the start of the Second, the induction of the military equipment in the British Armed Forces were partly determined by a number of curious military attitudes. These centred particularly around three instruments of warfare:tanks,planes and horses.

In spite of incontrovertible evidence regarding the massive production of tanks in Germany and Hitler's preparation for the next war, successive Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff between 1918 and 1939, did not exert themselves to mechanise the Army. Some were openly and actively obstructing any idea of tank warfare. For example when Maj Gen Fuller , an early protagonist of mechanization, won a Gold Medal for his book, he was castigated by successive Chiefs of Staff. Liddel Hart, produced a number of articles and books on mechanization. When he submitted his competitive essay on 'Mechanization of the Army', it was rejected in favour another entry titled 'Limitations of the Tank'. However, the German, who got a copy of Hart's essay were so much enthused that Panzer General Guderian mad it a compulsory reading for all the German General Staff! Sir Philip Chetwode, Commander-in-Chief India, even after the proven success of tanks in the North West Frontier, declared that the Army in India would be unlikely to adopt tanks for a very long time and even if it did , it would only be to keep the momentum of horsed Cavalry.

Between 1914 and 1918 aeroplanes were put to use for bombing sorties, ground support and reconnaissance by the British as well the Germans with considerable success. It was obvious that air superiority will be a decisive factor in any future wars. The private industry was developing more and more powerful aircraft with improvement in performance and safety. However the Army and the Admiralty evinced little enthusiasm and having a new junior service in the form of RAF was complete anathema. The usual rivalry between the Army and navy were forgotten due to their mutual dislike of the new service. The opposition to tanks by the Army and to the aeroplanes by the Navy ( who were more vociferous), has to be viewed in the context of their fear that their domains might get curtailed by these new technological developments. Added to that was the fear budget cuts in the areas they were comfortable with.

In 1935 worsening elations with Italy had put the British fleet in Malta at serious risk from sudden air attack. When this fear was expressed by Liddle Hart, Sir Philip Chetwode wrote “ You are evidently crammed up by the Air propaganda.. There is only one way in which Air can win a war and that is by bombing women and children; and that will never bring a great nation to its knees. You know that the Navy laughs at the Air now. They have got protected decks and with their 'blisters' and multiple machine guns and multiple anti-aircraft guns , they do not fear them in the slightest.” However, the British abandoned Malta . Only six years later the British saw , to their horror, what Air could do and did at Pearl harbour!

The fall of Singapore is a case study on the aspects of inter service rivalry.

Between early December 1941 and mid February 1942, the 'impregnable' fortress of Singapore fell lock,stock and barrel into the hands of the Japanese. It was so swift that even the Japanese were surprised by the ease, speed and enormity of their success. Analysing the causes for the fall of Singapore , Norman Dixon in his book has to say this. The loss of Singapore had its its origin in much earlier events. In 1925, there was a protracted and acrimonious argument between the Army,Navy and the Air Force Chiefs as to how Singapore should be defended. Army and navy pressed for fortifiications and deployment of heavy guns to repel the attack from seaward. The RAF advocated a large force of aircraft to repel any attack before it could come within the range of the island. Army and Navy won their case at the expense of their junior service. Heavy fixed armaments became the order of the day. The Army was of the view that Japanese would not be able to bring their tanks through the impenetrable jungles of the Malay Peninsula. The bitter inter-service quarrel resulted in an almost total lack of co-ordination between the services so much so that the Headquarters of Army, Navy and Air Force were sites as far apart as possible. RAF even began constructing airfields without consulting the Army who were responsible for defending them.

As far Navy who were the protagonists of sea facing fixed heavy guns for its sole protection and were against the deployment of Air Force, found that there were only thirty rounds of ammunition for each of the guns enough to last one round per day for a month! Added to that was the induction of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse rushed to Singapore at the last moment under command od Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Despite strong warnings that he would not be getting any fighter protection from the Air Force, he was too soon off with his two ships in search of trouble. Without informing Singapore he decided to 'go in and help' in the reported attack on Kuantan. His ships , spotted by Japanese aircraft were torpedoed and sunk with a total loss of about 900 officers and men.

Major General Gordon Bennett , commanding the 8^th Australian Division was not even prepared to discuss the nedd for putting anti-tank defences in the North in spite of repeated pleadings by Brigadier Simson, the Chief engineer. Bennett wrote ' Malay Command sent Brigadier Simson to discuss with me the creation of anti-tank obstacles for use on the road... Personally I have little time for these obstacles.. preferring to stop and destroy tanks with anti-tank weapons.' When the first tanks appeared to the surprise of the British troops who have been all along told that the Japanese tanks could never operate in the jungle country such as Malaya, the British had not a single tank to oppose them. Japanese tanks moves easily between the spacious rows between the rubber trees.

The role played by General Percival , the General Officer Commanding Malaya is slated for in the post titled “Military Incompetency” later on.

The Indian Scenario:

The Indian Armed Forces suffer equally from the malaise of both inter-service and intra-service rivalry, competition and one-upmanship. As opposed to the British Armed Forces, Indian Navy and Air Force are of more or less equal vintage. Though Indian Army is centuries older than both of them, they suffer from an inferiority complex. One may rather put it in another way that both Navy and Air Force display a superiority complex. This mind set was earlier exclusive to the Officers cadre but has now unfortunately percolated to other ranks as well.

The first Indian to become Chief of the Army staff was in the rank of General was KM Kariappa in January 1949 .The first Indian to become the Chief of Naval Staff was RD Katari in the rank of Vice Admiral in April 1958 almost a decade later. The first Indian to become the Chief of Air Staff was S.Mukerjea in the rank of Air Marshal in the year 1954. Till 1955, all were designated as Commander -in-Chief of their respective services. For about six years the Chief of Air Staff and for about nine year the chief of naval Staff were of a rank lower than that of the Army though in the warrant of precedence they enjoyed the same status. There were many Army Commanders who were seniors in service and rank as well but did not enjoy the privileges attached to C-in_C of Navy and Air force as the appointment was then called.

Prior to starting of Joint Services wing for the Army, Navy and Air Force Officers and their subsequent commissioning, there were only a handful of Indians in the RIN or RIAF where as there were very many Indian Officers in the British Indian Army who were holding King's Commission and served in major theatres of war in Europe, the far east as well as in the subcontinent. Even after the start of the JSW in Dehradun, the intake into Army was many times that to Navy and Air Force. This apart, while the cadets for the Army wing were trained in India , those of the Navy and Air Force were sent to England for further training and grant of commission. The superiority complex among the Naval and Air Force officers therefore started from their cadet days as well and this continues even to this day at the National defence Academy as some how the cadets of these two wings feel that they are some one special for having gained entry to the wings whose intake is far less as compared to Army. Secondly the promotion prospects and the speed of promotion in the Navy and Air Force were much higher and faster than in the Army. It was not improbable for an Army Officer of the rank of major or Lt. Col to meet his course mate at NDA in the equivalent rank of Colonel in the navy and Air Force. Thirdly while the Army officers had to put in decades of service in non-family stations such service conditions are rare in Navy and Air Force. While Army station is forced to accept peace condition where they are stationed while there are no adequete( leave alone authorised) married accommodation, education facilities for children etc. an Air Force Station or Naval Station is not accepted as operational unless all these infrastructures are fully met. For example in a station like Pathankot, Air Force Station will have 100% authorised accommodation for all its personnel, infrastructure for their offices and work areas where as the Army stationed there may not have even 20% of what is authorised but still accept it as a peace station. The Army therefore feels that they are always on low priority in terms of resource allocation not only for their military hardware but also for other basic requirements. In spite of the fact that the Air Force is holding 10% of the manpower , and the Navy even half of that, the number ratio of officers in the higher equivalent ranks of Brigadiers and above in the Navy and Air Force to total number of Officers in these wings are much higher as compared to Army.

At the time of partition, the Indian Army had total of 88 Infantry battalions , 12 regiments of Armoured Corps. The Indian Navy had 19 assorted warships comprising Frigates, Sloops, Corvettes,Minesweepers and seventeen assorted other vessels including Survey Ships,a tanker and motor launchers. The Air Force had Seven Fighter Squadrons and two Transport squadrons. With acute shortage due to meagre budget allocation for the Defence Budget during the first three five year plans, there was a more or less a fierce competition among the Army, Navy and Air Headquarters in sharing this allocation. The total defence expenditure in 1950-51 was just Rs.168 Crores and in 1960-61 it was Rs. 281 Crores barely managing to cater for pay, pension and inflation. ( Even after the outcry for defence preparedness after the Chinese aggression in 1962 , the increase in annual budget allocation for defence did not touch even 3% despite the fact that the rupee was devalued by more than 57% in June 1966 and most of the defence procurement were from foreign countries) There was no Commander-in-Chief ( as the post was abolished) who had the power to prioritise the meagre budget allocation for procurement of hardware among the three wings. This anomaly gave the bureaucrats in the MoD especially the Defence Secretary to decide on the interse priority among the three wings of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately , the Chiefs of the three wings rather than projecting a combined front, started wooing the bureaucrats , for getting a better share compared to the other. This was the start of the ascendancy of the say of bureaucrats over the Chiefs of the three wings on matters of defence policy as well. (The state of affairs continues to this day and in fact much worsened so much so even promotion to the rank of Major General or its equivalent is interfered with bureaucrats and politicians on this aspect a separate post in this blog later) . The neglect of the Armed Forces especially that of the Army had a telling during the 62 and 65 Wars. We shall presently see the role of Navy and Air Force till the 1965 war with Pakistan. The material for the subsequent paragraphs have been culled from various sources and most importantly from the official history published by MoD which is in public domain and available in the internet.

Neither during the 1947 conflict with Pakistan, nor during the Hyderabad action Navy had any major role to play. During the Goa action , Indian Navy did play a major role against very feeble opposition and the war was over in a matter of two days. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was largely fought over the Himalayas and the Navy had only a defensive role in the war. Indian Naval activity in the Pakistani War of 1965 largely involved coastal patrols. During the war, the Pakistani Navy attacked the Indian coastal city of Dwarka, although there were no military resources in the area. While this attack was insignificant, naval resources were deployed to patrol the coast and to deter further bombardment.

As far air force, during the 1947 conflict ,no air-to-air encounters took place between the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Pakistan Air Force. Indian Air Force and civilian aircraft were extensively used for air lifting the troops, weapons and evacuation of casualties. Air Force did provide ground support by strafing the enemy positions, their concentration areas etc. During the Hyderabad action , the Indian Air Force was involved in providing close air support to the advancing troops. They also flew a few strafing missions against the airfield at Hakimpet and later strafed a parade of Razakars at Gulbarga. The operations were on a small scale and of negligble consequence for the Army operations. In the Goa operations, the Air Force was tasked for the following: the destruction of Goa’s lone airfield in Dabolim, without causing damage to the terminal building and other airport facilities ,destruction of the wireless station at Bambolim, Goa,denial of airfields at Daman and Diu and support to advancing ground troops. In the absence of any Portuguese air presence, Portuguese ground based anti-aircraft units attempted to offer resistance to the Indian raids, but were overwhelmed and quickly silenced, leaving complete air superiority. In 1965, in the Rann of Kutch episode, the Official history published by the Ministry of Defence narrates “ At 11.40 A.M, on 14 April ( 1965), Air Marshal Asghar Khan, C-in-C Pakistan Air Force , rang up his Indian Counterpart, Air marshal Arjan Singh, to suggest that the aircraft of both the countries should not fly over the 'disputed' Kanjarkot area , as it might escalate fighting. He also suggested that the fighter and bomber aircraft of both the Air Forces should not fly with in 16 Km of the border. The Indian Air Chief accepted the proposal but added that the Indian helicopters and transport aircraft would be used for supply purpose.

When a full fledged Armoured thrust was launched in the Chamb sector, Gen. Choudhury along with Air Marshal Arjan Singh met Defence Minister Chavan and the Defence Secretary PVR Rao at around 1600 hrs on 1^st September for permission to use IAF. After the go ahead was given IAF came into action. On 2^nd September IAF aircraft were mainly used for fighter sweeps. On 3^rd September they decided to give for the PR sorties against Pak sabres. Migs were introduced only on 4^th September. While the IAF was brought into battle only after 1^st September without any previous detailed planning either for ground support or for destruction of enemy strongholds, PAF had detailed plan to attack vital air fields in India by as early as June 65. This was code named their War Plan No 6. On 06 September, by 1300 hrs. the plan was ordered to be put into action by the concerned PAF units . According to the plan. Eight F-86 successfully raided Pathankot airbase and destroyed two Mig-21, 6 Mysteres, one Gnat and and one C-119 packet. Two Gnats and a Mystere were damaged. Halwara was attacked at 1840 hrs by four F-86 and shot down two Hunters who were capping the air field. Amritsar radar Station was attacked thrice without much damage. Jamnagar base was raided six times . Four Vampires were damaged. There was no much anti air craft flak from the Indian side or any fighter interception against them , so much so that some cres flew as many as three missions against Jamnagar air base in a period of three hours. F-86 mission against Adampur was disrupted by four Hunters of IAF . IAF lost a Mig-21 during the night raid by PAF. IAF retaliated with counter-air strikes over air bases at Sargodha, Chhota Sargodha, Rahwali, Chander, Gujrat, Bhagatnwala,Chaklala and Pasrur. No aircrafts were found in any of these airfields. They could destroy a radar unit at Rahwali and ignite a fuel dump at Chklala. As per Official records in the Indian Army, the ground support provided by IAF during its offensive in Punjab against vigorous PAF ground attack was totally lacking. John Fricker has also corroborated this : “Incredibly, the Indian offensive struggled on without any form of air support and the IAF did not challenge the repeated ground attack sorties flown without loss by the PAF.” Between 8 September to 22 September most of IAF and PAF engagements were to attack the air bases of each other and the ensuing air battles. While IAF claims that their strike at Khemkaran sector blunted the Pakistani armour thrust, it is only partly true. As summarised in the official history of the war by MoD, there were certain clear deficiencies in the control of IAF operations. Air Defence and Offensive support operations were controlled by two separate organisations. These were AD Area and Advance HQ and Western Air Command respectively. In the initial stages of the war , the aim of IAF was to achieve favouarble air superiority. Since they failed to achieve this , they devoted most of their effort for their own defence and gave a low priority for offensive ground support to the Army. CAPs and escorts used up almost two thirds of entire Air effort. Also, ground attack air crafts for close air support to the Army needed fighter escorts which could not be dovetailed with the requirement of Air Defence due to limited availability and dual control by different organisations with different aims. Due to this offensive effort could not be sub-allotted By Air HQ to Tactical Air Centres located with the Corps Headquarters. When a request is passed on to a Station Commander, who also would get orders from Air HQs, WAC for various other assignments, the request from TAC forwarded the previous evening would be given the lower priority if at all aircraft are available by next morning! No wonder Army is now demanding attack helicopters to be given to Army Aviation so that they get guaranteed and responsive offensive air support.( especially after their experience while dealing with Air Force during Kargil Ops- the details of which are available in the public domain). The Chief of Air Staff recently compared this legitimate requirement of the Army to Coast Guard requesting for submarines! I wonder how these Chiefs will conduct a coordinated future war! They all talk of so called 'Network Centric Operations' what ever that may mean. It is exasperating.

The case for Attack Helicopters integral to the Army :
After much criticisms, hear burning among the Army and Air Force, the MoD has accepted the validity of Army having its own wing of attack helicopters. But the justification for the same could not be presented by the Army in the past in a cogent and convincing manner by the Army HQ. The reason for the same lies mainly at the door steps of many of the Corps and Army Commanders. It is borne out of past experience and records of the past wars as given in the official history published by MoD itself, that the Indian  Air Force was prepared to provide 'close  Air Support' for the Army operations only when they were able to achieve ' favourable Air Situation'. Their first priority had been and will always be to safeguard their own  air combat potential and air defence of own airfields. Army operations, especially those which are swift and fast using mechanized forces  will have to wait till the Air Force is able to achieve 'favourable Air situation'. Can the timing of the Army operations wait for such uncertain close air support? In today's technological scenario with fast communication, satellite coverage of operational areas ,element of surprise will be lost giving adequate warning of intentions to the Army. More importantly plum opportunity to exploit  a situation may be lost by the Army. It is therefore all the more essential that the Army has at least assured close air support for its mobile forces to not only defend and protect its mobile columns but also attack enemy concentration areas. Though this was a well known and admitted fact, Army could never convince the MoD for having its integral Armed Helicopters. Firstly, the Air Force was able to convince the MoD on extra financial outlay on maintenance, training and infrastructure needed for the Army in having its own integral flights. Secondly and more cynically, they could produce various official and demi-official documents written by various Corps and Army Commanders glorifying the Air Support provided during various Training exercises and War games. One should also note that during these war games and major exercises there is no physical threat from the enemy Air Force and ' favourable air situation' was an assured 'Term of reference'. In most cases it was also because the Air Force obliged these Commanders a few  trips to oversee the progress of the exercise  and  some times  joy rides in their helicopters. 

Between 1962 and 1965

Enquiries:

On April 1, 1963, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan informed the Lok Sabha that “with my approval the Chief of Army Staff [COAS] had ordered a thorough investigation to be carried out”. He specified the issues for the probe. The task was entrusted to Lieutenant-General T.B. Henderson-Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat. On May 12, they submitted their report to the COAS, who, in turn, forwarded it to the Defence Minister, with his comments, on July 2. Chavan made a formal statement on the report to the Lok Sabha on September 2, 1963.

in 2008, the Defense Minister, Mr AK Antony told the indian Parliament that the Herderson Brooks could not be declassified. Mr Antony claimed that the report could not be made public because an internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value.” It is ridiculous to assume that  a more than half-a-decade old report can  still claim to have any ‘operational value’. It is also illogical that the " Official History of the Conflict with China (1962)"  prepared by the History Department of the Defence Ministry, which  details all aspects of the war and  ‘operations’ in full details is available in public domain. This report is available at

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/1962Main.pdf

Many reasons can be advanced as to why  the Government is so secretive about this report. May be, because while Lt.Gen. Handerson Brooks and Brig. PS Bhagat would have in their report  analysed the events threadbare especially the role played by  Kaul, Thapar and  BN Mullick or the lack of it.  BN Mullick in spite of his failing as IB Chief continued to wield enormous clout and remained as its head for 17 long years. PS Bhagat was a no nonsense man and would call a spade a spade.  He became well aware of he failings of various departments of the Government machinery leading to the 1962 debacle by virtue of his association in drafting the report.as a c0-member. May be that could be  one of the the reasons why Lt.Gen. PS Bhagat was denied to become COAS  by giving an extension to GG Bewoor though at that point in time there was any imminent external threat or internal disturbance.( more on it else where). 

About Neville Maxwell

Neville Maxwell was a British journalist who in 1959 , was posted to New Delhi as South Asia correspondent. In 1967 he went as a senior fellow to the School of Oriental and African Studies in London in order to write India's China War. He was with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford University at the time when his book “India's China War”was published in 1971. Maxwell's characterisations of India in general, and of the India-China conflict in particular, are deeply biased against India, and in favour of China. Accordingly, his reputation remains poor here and decidedly mixed among Western scholars. Other historical blunders by Neville Maxwell include his assessment in the 1960s that India would no longer remain a democracy for much longer. While serving as the subcontinental correspondent of The Times of London, Maxwell authored a series of pessimistic reports filed in February 1967. In the atmosphere leading up to the 4th Lok Sabha elections, he wrote that "The great experiment of developing India within a democratic framework has failed. [Indians will soon vote] in the fourth—and surely last—general election."

In its reference to “an unpublished Indian Army report on these events” and, indeed, the contents of the book, left none in doubt that he had had access to the report. All doubt has since been dispelled by his citation of precise details of the report in an article entitled “Henderson-Brooks Report: An Introduction” published in the Economic and Political Weekly on April 14, 2001, He subsequently put it up on the Internet. He wrote: “The Henderson-Brooks Report is long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures, covers nearly 200 foolscap pages), detailed and far ranging. This introduction will touch only upon some select points, to give the flavour of the whole…..”

Claude Arpi, in an article in the Jan/Mar ‘11 issue of "Indian Defence Review"  states " While the information contained in Maxwell’s book originates from the Herderson brooks report of the 1962 debacle, this document is today the most well-kept secret of the Indian Government. Does it make sense that an episode commented on by Heads of State of the united States and China in the 1970’s, is still hidden from the Indian public in 2010? It seems that the official answer is ‘yes’. "

The full text of the article can be read at the following link.

  http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Henderson_Brooks_Bhagat.pdf

The Chief of Army Staff:

 General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri    20 November 1962 - 7 June 1966

After passing out from Royal Military College at Sandhurst, JN Chaudhuri joined the Indian Army in February 1928 and quickly rose through the ranks; he was awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his services in South East Asia theatre as a cavalry/tank commander.He was honoured for his services in world war two by allowing him leadership of Indian contingent in the victory parade at London.Following a course at the Imperial Defense College at England in 1947  he was appointed Director of Military Operations & Intelligence at Army headquarters in New Delhi in November 1947. He commanded the 1948 Operation Polo to annex Hyderabad in September 1948 and served as the Military Governor of Hyderabad State (1948–49). He was promoted to the rank of General in 1962 and took over as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) after Gen PN Thapar tendered his resignation. Had VKK Menon remained as the Defence Minister, it was improbable that he would have made it to the Chief's rank since it was a known fact that Menon was not favorably disposed of towards Chaudhury.

He handled the delicate post-war situation firmly and took several decisions to empower the armed forces.

The after effects of 1962 War

The 1962 war  brought about an  increased awareness to the politicians and general public about the strength and weaknesses of the Indian Armed Forces. In the fifties the defence expenditure was just about sufficient to meet the pay and pension and minimum maintenance of military hardware handed over by the British.
Any proposal for a normal increase even to meet the cost escalation in the annual budget met with strong opposition in Parliament.  There was no induction of new equipment and the Army , having to keep the troops busy and trim has to devise ways and means to keep them engaged especially in peace areas. They were derisively called  "Parade Ground Army". There were not  proper Offices even for the Army, Navy or Air Force Headquarters.Thanks to temporary hutments built by the British adjacent to the South Block for their use for the Second World war, the departments could find some semblance of office accommodation. One can well imagine the state of affairs in lower formations and units. ( It would take another decade to lay the foundation stone for Sena Bhawan in New Delhi).

It came as a rude shock to Jawaharlal Nehru, that in spite of the fact that he was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) with Tito and Nasser , neither they nor any other member of NAM came to his rescue during the 1962 crisis. It was again to US , Nehru had to beg for assistance for providing military hardware. It is a moot point that whatever was received by way of US Aid was too little too late. However it gave at east an idea of how these modern equipment will be indispensable for equipping our Armed Forces.
Self reliance was the new mantra. Organisations such as Defence Research and Development, Factories for manufacturing motor transport, tanks, aircraft, ships under Public Sector were getting established. Without a sound industrial, engineering design  backing locally these were initially tasked to assemble foreign supplied kits. The indiginization  has to suffer due to the Nehruvian economic policy of "quota-license-permit." HAL, Tank factory at Avadi, Vehicle Factory at Jabalpur , Rifle Factory at Ishapore , Naval Dock yard for building frigates came into being. ( A separate post on how some of these have degenerated into trading houses and centres of corruption later). It was anathema to involve private industry in any defence related enterprise to the skewed thinking that it would impinge on security. The bureaucrats started wielding  enormous clout as they would be the people to clear quotas, licenses and permits. While there were no major scams involving them those days as we see them today, their powers and thereby their arrogance climbed up exponentially and has not abated ever since.

With acute funds at the disposal of the Armed Forces , there was bound to be a fierce competition to have the bigger share of the cake between Army, Navy and Air Force. With post of Commander-in-Chief abolished, the umpiring has to be done by the Defence Minister to lay down priorities which he would generally pass it on to the Defence Secretary. Therefore he now became all too powerful a man. He could promote inter service rivalry , which is a natural  ingredient in most of the armies especially among the British Armed Forces, whose legacy we acquired. It was in this scenario that the nation faced the Pakistan aggression of 1965. 

( About inter service and intra- service  rivalry I intend discussing them in a separate post)

Events leading to NEFA debacle

" The size of the forces of the Crown maintained by Great Britain is governed by various conditions peculiar to each service , and is not arrived at by any calculations of the requirements of foreign policy , nor is it possible that they should ever be calculated"

                                                        Extract from a paper on Imperial Defence dated June 22nd 1926 

" Those who subscribe to the theory that the armed forces should be designed to implement the nation's chosen external policies should rid their minds of childish delusions; it is the size and shape of the armed forces , their recruiting rate, their equipment and their conditions of service which matter, and those charged with the formulation of foreign and defence policy had better order their affairs accordingly" 

                                               "The military heresy", review in the Times literary Supplement  June 30, 1972   

( The above quotes taken from Chapter 9 of the book "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence")     

 Preamble :
                   

There have been a spate of  books, papers, debates, lectures on and about the Chinese aggression of 1962. The authors of these ranged from junior officers of the Indian Army from the ranks of Majors to Generals, bureaucrats of the rank of Cabinet Secretary, junior journalist to eminent senior editors of highly acclaimed newspapers.  Every one had their own view point to defend their actions or inaction which culminated in this debacle. However the book " India's Defence Problem",  by SS Khera ,who was the Cabinet Secretary of  takes the cake for defending both Jawharlal Nehru and the bureaucrats connected with India's defence, foreign and financial policies. The fact that he was one of the few people who could report on this crucial event with the authority of an 'insider' makes it more important for any analyst or critic to read between the lines and to do extensive research to rebut or accept his claims. I will be quoting extensively from this book to compare  how Great Britain was equally unprepared  in between the War Years ( between the First and Second world war).  I will be quoting also from the book "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" by Norman Dixon. 

Partition Council and India's Share 

In June 1947, the British Government announced that the British India would be divided into two nations and granted independence on 15 August the same year. A partition Council under the Chairmanship of the Viceroy was set up to govern the division and reorganization of the Armed forces between them.. Till the two governments were in a position to administer their respective forces, the C-in-C in India will be in overall  control. He was appointed Supreme Commander from 15 august 1947 until the division was completed. A secretariat came into being , headed by two Joint Secretaries representing the Defence Department of the two dominions.

The partition of the Armed  Forces was effected in two stages. In the first stage the forces were divided roughly on a communal basis. The units where personnel were of Muslim majority were moved to Pakistan and those where the Hindus in majority were moved to India. In the next stage with in the unit a voluntary transfer was effected. If there are Hindus in such units as in Pakistan they can opt out to India and vice versa. However the Muslim belonging to Pakistan area was not given the option to join the forces of India. Muslim personnel from the rest of India and non-Muslim personnel from Pakistan were however free to opt to either of the dominion. However following the events of killings and arson many were reconsidering  their intial option and later on permitted to change their options. All these were creating a lot of confusion and paper work more so when the troops themselves were heavily committed in Law and order, protection of refugees etc.
The Infantry regiments were divided between India and Pakistan in the ratio of 15 to 8 , though the population and land mass, the border abutting neighbours for India is much more than that of Pakistan. The Armoured Corps were divided fifty fifty. ( 12 Regiments to India and 6 to Pakistan) The Artillery units were in the ratio of 18 and half to eight and a half, and the engineers in the ratio of 61 to 34. Mind you these ratios were worked out by the Joint Secretaries of the Defence Departments of the two dominions.

By October 1947 , the division of the Air force and Navy was completed. More than a hundred special trains were allotted for the movement of troops aggravated as it was by the movement of refugees. The fact that the Armed forces personnel displayed utmost discipline and non partisan attitude nor swayed by religious compulsions to a large extent speaks for volumes for the command and control  displayed by  the Officers. By 30 November 1947, the Supreme Commander post of both the dominions was abolished. It is no coincidence that the Pakistan Army  invaded Kashmir on 20 October 1947. Gen Lockhart was still the Supreme Commander of both the dominions. It is impossible to believe that he was not aware of the invasion   for good about a week. Very rightly later on when things became clear that he had deliberately and purposely did not take any action or inform the Indian government made Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to insist that he be sacked as the C-in-C of India which Nehru reluctantly agreed to.

It is not my wish to elaborate on the  47-48 war with Pakistan. Suffice it to say when our Army was in the threshold of evicting last of the Pakistan army from Jammu and Kashmir, Jawaharlal Nehru, ignoring the request of  Thimayya, Cariappa and even some his political and cabinet colleagues  took up the issue with the United Nations. This resulted in ceasefire and  creation of PoK having a eastern border along the cease fire line. We are grappling with that problem today  at enormous cost to the nation and enormous loss of life of the Armed Forces personnel and other para military forces.

National Security Concerns in the Nineteen Fifties:
Generally after a major war or a serious confrontation leading to major fights or even skirmishes result in various benefits  for the victor  and some times even for the vanquished. Lessons are learnt by the military from their own mistakes and those of the enemy , new tactical plans based on engagements can be evolved, the type and capabilities of the weapons used by the enemy would give an insight into what would be required to equip the forces for a future engagement. There would be an urgent requirement to replenish the military hardware lost/ destroyed/ rendered beyond repairs. Unfortunately , as we will presently see no such thought seem to have been given by the powers that be after the 1947-48 war with Pakistan.

SS Khera in his book ( mentioned elsewhere) ,  quotes the official standing orders which sets out the first  function of the Ministry of Defence " Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution , and after its termination to effective demobilisation" .  To ensure that the Armed forces Headquarters carry out the first function in the standing order, he further postulates what they are supposed to be doing. Quote " They must assess the shortfalls in the forces at their disposal , as well as in the other resources needed, acquaint themselves with the availabilities and limitations of the resources of the nation that could be allotted to defence; they must request the resources needed and available with in those limitations, and in good time . ..... The Military Chiefs cannot carry on in times of peace as if nothing will happen and as if there is  nothing to be done. Yet this was the sort of thing that seemed to be happening most of the time as the Indian Army was concerned" . The book was basically written to decry the Indian Army and particularly the Officer corps and apportion the blame for the 1962 debacle entirely  to them .To summarize he has to say these:

1. Until 1947, Indian Army had remained outside the main stream of  political events as compared to the Civil establishment and civilian cadres ( read ICS cadres).
2.  There were very few  Officers of Indian nationality mostly in junior ranks. 
3.   Even after the Second World war which saw rapid promotions , there was not even a Indian Junior  Major General ( Cariappa was a Brigadier in 1947, Mukerjee was an Air Commodore, Katari was a  Commander  -  quoted from the book).
4. The administrative machine of the country run by Indian ICS officers was highly experienced and made India as a viable going concern as a nation after Independence. 
5. During the fifties , the senior ranking commanders appear to have become more increasingly isolated from the main stream of the new economic, social and political developments than they had been , while serving as comparatively junior officers under the British.
6. They were used only for receiving and carrying out orders from the British , concerned in the main with comparatively small bodies of men, and tiny parts of an overall campaign.
7. Thy simply did not know and had no experience of, the working relationships within the total matrix of which now they formed a part within the perimeters of a parliamentary democracy.    He concludes  that with the above handicaps of the Indian top commanders in mind it is perhaps easier to understand their part in the general failure of the Indian Army in NEFA 1962.  

( I would hasten to add that this book by SS Khera was probably written primarily  to save Jawaharlal Nehru from criticism, the political leaders who were Ministers in various Departments connected with equipping the Army, the bureaucrats of these departments whose duty it was to ensure that resources are allocated )

This book ' India's Defence Problem ' by SS Khera was published in 1968 with valuable help from very senior officers of that time including Gen.J N Choudhury and others in the National Defence College( as acknowledged by the author). I am surprised why no  Officer of the Indian Armed Forces in general and from the Army in particular did not rebut many of his ill conceived conclusions. Was it  because he was a very senior and powerful man in the bureaucracy? Or was it because that the book was so obviously written to exonerate Jawaharlal Nehru and cover the lapses of the MoD and its  bureaucrats there was no need to do so? Or was it written to counter "The Himalayan Blunder" by Brig JP Dalvi published at that time?  I have come across this book only now while I was in the process of writing this blog. I feel  that it is my bounden duty to bring it to the knowledge of the public the factual background leading to the debacle in 1962.  Many of my arguments will be based on the contents of the said book itself . One may read the following as a para wise comments.

 1. It is to the credit of the Indian Armed Forces that they remained outside the political stream then, now and they will remain so for ever. The nation should be thankful that the Army remains apolitical and secular.Compare this.  Even Jawaharlal Nehru often ridiculed the ICS for its support of British policies. He once said of the Indian Civil Service,"with which we are unfortunately still afflicted in this country  ( even after Independence) , as neither Indian, nor civil, nor a service”. The Armed Forces under the British, governed by Army Acts and Army Rules, were British Indian Army, Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force and they have to necessarily obey any lawful command of their superiors and the C-in-C of the British Indian Army.
2. It is equally true there were very few ICS Officers at the time Independence. Indian Civil Service (ICS), was the elite higher civil service in the period of the British Raj. Initially almost all the top 1000 officials were British. After Minto- Morley reforms, by 1914 about 5% of them were Indians. By 1947 there were 600 Indians and about equal number of the British. After Independence may about 200 of them left for Pakistan.
Most of them were in the Revenue departments as Collectors/ sub Collectors. Cariappa joined the first batch of  KCIOs (King's Commissioned Indian Officers) in 1919. By 1947 he had put in 28 years of Military Service. The other Senior Officers in the Army would have  been  between 24 to 27 years. It is not the rank that counts for maturity but the experience. One may ask how much of service Mr. SS Khera put in by the time he reached the rank of  Joint Secretary?  Today 100% of  IAS officers reach the rank of Joint Secretary in just about 16-18 years as compared to 1% of Army officers reaching the rank of  Major General after 32 years.
3. The Army is a structured Organisation. There can be only one Major General in a Division and Only One Captain for a Platoon. Unless the organisation expands with additional new raisings , there are no slots for promotions. The fact that even a decorated officer of the British Indian Army like Cariappa was only a Brigadier after 28 years of service disproves the author's claim that there were rapid promotions  due to Second World War.  Mukerjee was Commissioned in the Royal Indian Air Force in 1932  as one of  first  six  Indians to join flying training in England.  It does not however mean that by 1947 , he would not know much about Air Force or the requirement of an  Air Force. On the contrary  of the bureaucrats in the MoD at that time may not have even flown even in a civil aircraft leave alone knowing the difference between a fighter and a bomber !
4. The Administrative Machinery under the British was mainly concerned with revenues, taxation, finance and law. The ICS officers were not involved even remotely  regarding foreign policy, diplomacy, military matters, foreign trade ,procurement of armaments, military hardware, manufacturing , ordnance factories etc.as these were controlled and administered by the British  Officers only. These are the areas that affect the defence and national security of the country and in these areas they had no experience to fall back upon. They also had no clue as to what was the nation's chosen foreign policy vis-a-vis China or Pakistan then . Unfortunately even today it is so!
5.  To rebut the fallacy floated by the author that the Officers were isolated from the economic, social and political developments, I quote what Lt. Gen. SK Sinha had written in an article. Quote "Two instances affecting the officers of my generation underscore their sense of loyalty and discipline. The first pertained to our emoluments and the second to the reckoning of the seniority of a certain category of officers. Our counterparts in the ICS and IPS were allowed to retain their higher emoluments that they were drawing in the British regime. In the case of the Army, the scales of pay of officers recruited before Independence were  drastically reduced to the new scales formulated for post-Independence entrants. To highlight what this meant, I may quote specific figures. I was a Major on the staff drawing Rs 1,065 per month. Overnight my salary was reduced to Rs 700 per month. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wrote on March 22, 1947, that this was very unfair to Army officers. The Finance Ministry maintained that whereas in the case of civilian officers, the numbers involved were  small, they were very large in the Army. The Government could not bear the heavy financial burden.

The second issue pertained to officers commissioned below the age of 21. During World War II, the minimum age of recruitment had been reduced to 18. It was arbitrarily decided that officers commissioned below 21 will have to forfeit nine months of seniority and pension. The reason given was that during the War, the period of cadet training for officers had been reduced by nine months. This was unconvincing. All officers, irrespective of age, had done the same duration of cadet training during the War. If any of us had gone to court on these two issues, these unfair orders would have been struck down. No one took recourse to legal action because that was against the culture of the Army. We accepted these Government decisions with a stiff upper lip." Unquote

6. The British Indian Officers  had taken part in every campaign during World War I and World War II. There was hardly a single officer left out of battle.  Even if you are a Battalion Commander attacking a Company, you are trained in the Army to be prepared to take on the job of a Brigade Commander. Cariappa , Thimayya etc had commanded  Brigades in battle and given a chance would have Commanded a Division as well. A Brigade size engagement can not be termed as a tiny part of a campaign. More importantly, the Army Organization is highly structured where even a safety pin is accounted for. To arrive at the requirement of a Corps or Command, it does not require the intelligence of Albert Einstein to extrapolate.

But the problem these Chiefs faced in the fifties was one of total negligence by an uncaring government and its bureaucracy in various departments responsible to specify the Nation's policy on defence, policy with regard to countries on our borders. The  politicians who have become prominent due to the freedom struggle 

came to occupy powerful ministerial berths in the Cabinet  for which many of them were most unsuitable. The ICS and later IAS lobby could take full advantage of the lack of knowledge and experience of these rabble rousers and establish their supremacy in every facet of governance.  

The Ministry of Defence in the fifties :

Sardar Baldev Singh Singh became India's first Minister of Defence in August 1947. He was born on July 11, 1902 in the Rupar district of Punjab to an aristocratic family. Singh was educated at the Khalsa College in Amritsar, and began working in his father's firm in the steel industry. He won an election to the Punjab provincial assembly under the Government of India Act 1935 in 1937, as a candidate of the Panthic party. He became closely linked with Master Tara Singh and the Shiromani Akali Dal.While the Congress Party launched the Quit India Movement, Baldev Singh and other Sikh leaders did not support it. Singh negotiated an agreement with Sikander Hyat Khan, the leader of the Unionist Muslim League to form a government in Punjab, and became the provincial Development Minister for a brief time in the summer of 1942.

Though he was a man of considerable personal charm, he left all decisions concerning the Ministry of Defence to his Personal Secretary. The MoD was more or less run by his Personal Secretary Mr. Sarin. That the department was being run by his personal secretary and not even the Defence secretary at that time speaks volumes for the importance given to  Defence in a new independent nation with sworn enemies on its Western and Eastern borders and a threatening neighbour in the Northern borders. Nehru, as the Prime Minister had Utopian ideas of China – India relations, their great civilizations going back 2000 years, Panch Sheel and Non Alignment all to the detriment of  national security as events unfolded.

The first five-year plan( 1951 to 1956) plan addressed, mainly, the agrarian sector, including investments in dams and irrigation. The agricultural sector was hit hardest by the partition of India and needed urgent attention. The total planned budget of 2069 Crore was allocated to seven broad areas: irrigation and energy (27.2 percent), agriculture and community development (17.4 percent), transport and communications (24 percent), industry (8.4 percent), social services (16.64 percent), land rehabilitation (4.1 percent), and for all other sectors and services (2.5 percent). The allocation for defence was included in other sectors and services and there was virtually no plan for defence procurement or up gradation or making up for the short falls. The outlay was just sufficient for the pay and pension of the defence forces. This sorry state of affairs continued in the next plan as well.

The second five-year plan ( 1956-61) focused on industry, especially heavy industry. Unlike the First plan, which focused mainly on agriculture, domestic production of industrial products was encouraged in the Second plan, particularly in the development of the public sector.The total amount allocated under the second five year plan in India was Rs. 4,600 crore. This amount was allocated mainly to Power and irrigation,Social services,Communications and transport. The defence expenditure in 1960-61 touched a figure of about Rs. 280 Crores as compared to  Rs.200 crores in 1955-56.

The Chiefs of Army, Navy or Air Staffs had no say what so ever to impress the powers that be for enhancing their fighting potential . The hardware with the Indian Armed Forces were of the first and second world war vintage having seen extensive usage during the war and for training during peace. Any proposals for procurement of current military equipment by the Chiefs was decried that they wanted the latest 'toys' . They were advised to put into practice latest management techniques like Operation research etc. so as to make the best use of their available resources rather than clamouring for latest 'toys', which the nation can ill afford. (Though many of the bureaucrats in most of the departments  at that time were only aware of the subject tittles of these techniques, the Armed Forces had already included these in their training curricula and put into practice in their day to day running.) Any projection of  likely  threat from China from the North East and the requirement of the forces and equipment  to meet the same was derided. As the Prime Minister  himself had assured the Nation in the parliament that there was no threat from Chinese, any one casting aspersion against China, be they Armed Forces Commanders or politicians were decried as rightist and capitalists. The Communist party in India was vehemently supportive of this argument. 

Neither the Defence Minister as advised by his Personal Secretary nor the Finance Ministry had the foresight for resource allocation for military hardware procurement for the security of the nation in spite of the tremendous amount of hardware poring into Pakistan from the United States of America and the United Kingdom of whom they had become an ally as a member of CENTO and SEATO . During the 1950s, the People's Republic of China built a 1,200 km (750 mi) road connecting Xinjiang and western Tibet. This was in connivance with the Government of Pakistan. In return China also started helping Pakistan in its military build up.

The next Defence Minister was Gopalswami Ayyangar,(who as the author SS Khera puts it in his book) had no enthusiasm and was a tired old man. He died a few months after he took over as Defence Minister. The next in line was Dr. KN Katju who was basically a political stalwart of the Congress from UP. He had no clue about the Armed Forces and did not even know the differences between the three wings of the services. Added to that was his physical disability of deafness and it became a guessing game whether or not he was actually hearing what had been spoken to him. Here again, he became totally depended on the bureaucrats in his Ministry. By now the bureaucrats started calling the shots in full measure. Starting with re designating the title of Heads of Armed Forces, to down grading their warrant of Precedence, to raising the bogey of Military Coups at various intervals to create confusion in the minds of the people, they did all they could ,to gain supremacy and to ride rough shod over the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Staff. ( I will write about the passive reaction of the then Chiefs regarding these issues in a separate post).  Like the MoD , nearly almost all other departments more or less were run by the bureaucrats.

After Katju , Jawaharlal Nehru himself took over the portfolio of Defence Minister and appointed a maverick politician Mahavir Tyagi as Minister of State of Defence Organization under him. Of Tyagi, the  less said the better. He was variously called as a “ bull in the China shop”, ' an unguided missile” etc. It was therefore not uncommon for the Service Chiefs to avoid him as much as possible. Again the bureaucrats in the MoD had their last word in matters pertaining to National Security and Defence.

Then came VK Krishna Menon who was not a darling either to his party colleagues, bureaucrats or to the Chiefs except for his sycophants. Initially, there was a sigh of relief among the military top brass that at last an educated , intelligent and a hard working man had assumed the office of the Defence Minister. But soon they realised that he trusted no one and in turn he could not be trusted either. He promoted his own “favourites and confidants” in the military hierarchy on whom he could depend up on. He would not agree to Thimayya's proposals for strengthening the defences in the NEFA sector in spite of China's open belligerent attitude on the border question and the sanctity of McMohan line. On the controversy of promoting Kaul, Gen. Thimayya even handed in his resignation. 

He brought in Thapar as Second-in-Command to Gen. Thimayya in addition to continue being the
GOC-in-C Western Command a few months before Gen. Thimayya was to retire and got Lt.Gen. BM Kaul as Chief of General Staff. They two were considered close to Menon and that they would report to him on the happenings in the Service Headquarters of which many were baseless rumours. One such was that Gen. Thimayya was planning a coup and it was to be executed on 30 Jan 1961, the anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination. Kaul who was the Quarter Master General was asked to ascertain the move of a Division from Ambala to Delhi and an Armoured Brigade from Mathura. It is a moot point why the Defence Minister should ask Kaul rather than confront Thimayya directly. Kaul reported to Menon that the orders for thse moves were not known to any of the Principal Staff Officers at the Army Headquarters.  Later on  it turned out that they were part of a routine military exercise and Kaul wanted to pay back Thimayya in kind for opposing his promotion and placement as Chief of General Staff.  ( Compare this with the rumour floated in 2012, when some Mechanise units moved from Ambala to Hissar , that Gen. VK Singh was planning a coup!).

Krishna Menon also had the unique distinction especially in the initial years to dealing with the Service Chiefs directly to the consternation of the bureaucrats in the MoD who were used to the habit of riding rough shod over them in the past . This alarmed them greatly but they could not do much as Menon was very close to Nehru and enjoyed his confidence and support. Ultimately he lost the support of his own party men and even his civilian staff in the MoD.

On our Western front : 

Pakistan joined the US-led military alliances SEATO and CENTO. In 1954 the United States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan. Under Ayub Khan, Pakistan enjoyed a strong and healthy relationship with the United States.  In 1954, Ayub Khan had famously told Brigadier-General Henry A. Byroade and the United States that "I didn’t come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us.” Large-scale interaction between U.S. and Pakistani military started, with hundreds of officers began to sent to U.S. on routine and regular basis, getting trained shoulder-to-shoulders with U.S. Military.

From 1954 to 1956, the US gave Pakistan about $1400 million in military aid, helping an ill-equipped Pakistan Army develop infrastructure, mobility and firepower, and improve command, control, communication and intelligence capabilities for its newly raised divisions. Also in 1954, Pakistan began to receive more than 100 Sabre F-86F aircraft that made the core of its air force. Armed with Sidewinder missiles, these fighter planes gave the Pakistani air force a decisive edge over the Indian one. Pakistan had also received several hundred M47 and M48 Patton tanks and artillery equipment that gave it tangible superiority over India.  

(In the 1980s, after Pakistan rejected a $400 million aid package as peanuts, more than $6 billion flew into the country along with weapons that included about a thousand Stinger missiles, as it fought a perceived Soviet threat in Afghanistan and developed a ‘strategic depth’. Since 9/11 (blamed on the ‘strategic assets’ that Pakistan developed in Afghanistan), we received more than $14 billion in military aid and reimbursements, 17 F-16 aircraft and artillery equipment despite substantial doubts on its commitment to the war on terror. Pakistan Navy received the PNS Alamgir frigate, boats, helicopters and two P-3C Orion surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft (with six in the pipeline) and assigned a key role in the Arabian Sea.)

The warning signals:

In his speech in Asian Relations Conference, held in New Delhi in March-April 1947, Nehru called China as “ that great country to which Asia owes so much and from which so much is expected”. The Indian Ambassador to China after Independence, K. M. Panikkar, was greatly impressed by the

Mao Zedong and compared Nehru with him that “both are men of action with dreamy, idealistic temperaments both humanists in the broadest sense of the term.”

When China invaded Tibet in October 1950, Patel warned Nehru that Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam”.

In 1951, as Home Minister in Nehru's cabinet, Rajaji warned the Prime Minister of the expansionist designs of Communist China. He wrote to Nehru that he felt "hurt whenever Pannikar tells us with extreme satisfaction that China is very friendly to us yet has no territorial ambitions. We do not want any patrons now, do we?" ( Eleven years later India was invaded by China.)

In June 1954, Zhou-en-lai visited New Delhi. In a letter to his Chief Ministers written immediately

afterwards, Nehru reported that the Chinese Prime Minister „was particularly anxious, of course, for the friendship and co-operation of India….Nehru‟s made a return visit to China in October

1954. The reception he received was to flatter Nehru and to make him believe that they truly believed in their relationship with India.

Towards the end of 1956, Zhou-en-Lai visited India again along with the Dalai Lama in his party. The Dalai Lama told Nehru that conditions were so harsh in his country that he wished to flee to India. But Nehru advised him to return so as not to hurt the Chinese. “Hindi-Chini bhai bahai “ was still in cresendo. But when Nehru requested for a visit to Tibet in 1958, he was refused permission by his so called “bhai”.

In July 1958, the Chines printed a map which showed large parts of India as Chinese territory. It was also revealed that the Chinese had built a road linking Xinjiang to Tibet, which passed through an uninhabited, and scarcely visited stretch of the Indian district of Ladakh. There was diplomatic protest from New Delhi. Zhou-en-Lai in his reply wrote saying that the McMahon Line, marking the border between India and China, was a legacy of British imperialism and hence not legal. Even now neither Nehru, nor Krishna Menon would do anything to shore up the defences in NEFA. Gen. Thimayya , when asked for resources for the Army was not only turned down but ridiculed. Even the highly educated, enlightened and experienced higher echelons in the bureaucracy failed to voice their concern.

In March 1959 the Dalai Lama fled into India when China invaded Tibet to put down the revlt. He he was given refuge. This enraged the Chinese. Sporadic clashes between Indian and Chinese troops on the border erupted in the autumn of 1959.

When the first clashes broke out on the border in September 1959, Upadhaya of Jan Sangh said that “the present situation is the result of complacency on the part of the Prime Minister. It seems that he was reluctant to take any action till the situation became really grave. He has more faith in his Panch Sheel perorations than in preparation and performance”. Comparing him to the notoriously effete and incompetent 19^th century ruler of Awadh, Wajid Ali Shah, he said ‟Only he [Nehru] knows when a crisis is not a crisis and how to emit smoke without fire and how to arrest a conflagration in a Niagara of verbiage!‟

Responding to the border clashes in the second half of 1959, C. Rajagopalachari wrote several essays urging Nehru to abandon his long held and deeply cherished policy of non-alignment.

“The path of peace is not always smooth. China has incontinently betrayed India and Nehru. He dare not resist Indian public resentment over China's aggression and her attempt to sabotage India's position in the Himalayan frontier. Whatever be China's objective, this aggression and show of power have put an end to any meaning in non-alignment”.

Still in October 1959, Nehru wrote to all his Chief Ministers ( all the States were Congress ruled states) that “ the tension that has arisen between India and China is, of course, of great concern to us. That does not mean that we should get alarmed in the present or fear any serious consequences”. Can any one be so naïve even at that stage!

In 1960, Zhou-en-Lai came to New Delhi in an attempt to find a settlement. India's case was stronger in the Western sector, where Chinese interests were greater. Here lay the access road linking the two troublesome provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang, a road that passed through territory claimed by India. On the other hand, in the Eastern sector, where Chinese claims were more robust, their strategic interests were not high. Zhou offered a quid pro quo. The Chinese would not challenge Indian control of the eastern sector, so long as the Indians in turn winked at their incursions in the west. Nehru himself was open to considering it favourably. But by this time knowledge of the road in Ladakh had become public, and there was an outcry in Parliament and the press. The border clashes and the flight of the Dalai Lama had further inflamed public opinion.

Even by 1960, the mandarins in MoD would not take any action to build up the needed material and resources or at least raise their concerns with the Government. The Prime Minister and the Defence Minister were firm in their belief that no attack was possible in NEFA.

Jawaharlal Nehru , soon after the cease fire , in a letter written to his Chief Ministers on 22^nd December 1962 admitted the lack of preparedness of the Indian army and the lack of foresight of the political leadership in not building roads up to the border to carry supplies and ammunition whereas on the other side, the invasion of Tibet and the Korean war had made the Chinese primed and ready for battle. 

( Some portions of the above have been extracted from an essay by Ramachandra Guha)

Now, one can compare the conclusion arrived at by Mr. SS Khera in his book  to cover up Nehru and the bureaucracy from any sort of accountability for the 1962 debacle.

The Chiefs Of Army Staff 1947 to 1962

The British Indian Army and many of its young and eminent officers  had the good fortune to serve under some of the most  eminent Commanders of the Allied Forces like General Sir Archibald Wavell, General Claude Auchinleck,General Joseph Stilwell. They imbibed the true spirit of soldiering and most of them came to head the Indian Army in high ranks and a few becoming its Chiefs  after independence. When the British partitioned India, many opted to Pakistan as per their choice.

Auchinleck joined the Indian Army as an unattached second lieutenant and in 1904 joined the 62nd Punjabis. He learnt Punjabi and was able to speak fluently with his soldiers. He got familiarized with  a knowledge of local dialects and customs. This familiarity engendered a lasting mutual respect among the troops he commanded..

The 6th Indian Division, of which the 62nd Punjabis were a part,  landed at Basra in  December 1915 for the Mesopotamian campaign.North of Basra, the Punjabis were in heavy action in dreadful conditions: cold, rain and mud as well as determined Turkish defence reduced the regiment to 247 men and Auchinleck took temporary command when his regimental commander was wounded.  the Turkish army inflicted a humiliating reversal on the British and eventual success was hard won. Auchinleck learnt a number of practical lessons from this experiences. The most important was that  soldiers' health and well-being was critical to an army's effectiveness and he became convinced of the need of adequate rest, hygiene, good food and medical supplies for the troops.

On the outbreak of  Second world war  Auchinleck was appointed to command the Indian 3rd Infantry Division but in January 1940 was summoned to the United Kingdom to command IV Corps,the only time in  that a wholly British Corps was commanded by an Indian Army officer though a Briton. In January 1941 Auchinleck was recalled to India to become Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in which position he also was appointed to the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India.

Following Mountbatten's arrival in 1943, Auchinleck's India Command (which had equal status with South East Asia Command in the military hierarchy) was responsible for the internal security of India, the defence of the North West Frontier and the build up of India as a base, including most importantly the reorganisation of the Indian Army, the training of forces destined for SEAC and the lines of communication carrying men and material to the forward areas and to China. Auchinleck made the supply of Fourteenth Army, with probably the worst lines of communication of the war, his immediate priority. 

 William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army was later to write about him in a glowing tribute:

"It was a good day for us when he [Auchinleck] took command of India, our main base, recruiting area and training ground. The Fourteenth Army, from its birth to its final victory, owed much to his unselfish support and never-failing understanding. Without him and what he and the Army of India did for us we could not have existed, let alone conquered"

Auchinleck continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army after the end of the war helping, though much against his own convictions, to prepare the future Indian and Pakistani armies for the Partition of India (August 1947). In November 1945 he was forced to commute the sentence of transportation for life awarded to three officers of the Indian National Army in face of growing unease and unrest both within the Indian population, and the British Indian Army. In June 1946 he was promoted to Field Marshal but refused to accept a peerage, lest he be thought associated with a policy (i.e. Partition) that he thought fundamentally dishonorable  Having disagreed sharply with Lord Mountbatten , the  Viceroy of India, he resigned as C-in-C and retired in 1947.

However many senior British Officers and British Officers of the British Indian Army were in favor of partition. VP Menon, the Reforms Commissioner and Advisor to the Viceroy,  was  reported to have sounded Sardar Patel in Simla that Jinnah had the support of influential British opinion in his claim for Pakistan, and also more importantly, Jinnah was supported by most of the high officers of the Army in India. All of the high officers of the Army at that time were British.  Auchinlech,  as C-in-C was perhaps the only one to oppose partition. However, the idea for partitioning India  to create Pakistan as a buffer state in the West to counter the Russian influence percolating into Indian Sub continent was in their drawing board for long.
It is therefore no wonder many of the  very senior officers of Indian Army in the independent India imbibed the high qualities of  Auchinleck as we will see in subsequent narratives. 

C-in-C / COAS  of the Indian Armed Forces/ Indian Army

General Sir Robert McGregor Macdonald Lockhart  15 August 1947 31 December 1947.

 General Lockhart took over as C-in-C , after having been the Army Commander of eastern Army . He has the dubious distinction of the first ever Chief to be sacked by the Government of India though still being a British Dominion. in 1947.

Kashmir, the Princely State, the third letter in the acronym of “Pakistan” had not decided to join either Pakistan or India.. The Maharaja of J and K was thinking of making it a neutral country on the lines of Switzerland. It was speculated  that there was a possibility that he might accede to India, as J&K was geographically contiguous to both India and Pakistan and he was free to do so. 

By August 1947 (and even earlier) India was already grappling with the influx of refugees, food shortages and lack of most of the essential services. The Armed forces were getting reorganized. This was the most opportune time to invade Kashmir by proxy backed by regular forces. The planning and preparation for that probably had already been finalized in the drawing boards of Pakistan with active participation of British Officers who opted to go with the Pakistan Army.  The raids commenced in October 1947 barely within two months of Jinnah assuming office of the Governor General. Had Mountbatten taken over as the Governor General of Pakistan, in his capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces he would have got wind of it and could not have permitted employment of regular forces to take part in the invasion of Kashmir.

He might have even sounded India in advance. (He remained in India till June 1948). Lt.Gen. Sinha , in an article  narrates the events leading to the dismissal of Sir. Robert. Sir. Robert McGregor McDonald Lochart,  "was informed by his British counterpart in Pakistan of the preperations being made for the invasion of Kashmir . He failed to apprise the( Indian) Government nor did he take any action in the matter. Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 cought us totally unprepared. The Indian Army miraculously managed to retrieve the situation."  Sardar Patel took up the issue with Jawaharlal Nehru to sound the Governor General who sacked General Lockart. However, the reason for his sacking was not made public. 

General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher    1 January 1948 - 15 January 1949

During  World War II , he served as Assistant Adjutant General at GHQ India from 1941. He was put in charge of Administration ,Southern Command in 1942. After the War he was appointed General Officer Commanding Bengal and Assam Area in India. In 1946 he became General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Eastern Command  and in 1948 he was made Commander-in-Chief, India. We can infer that he was mostly employed in Staff duties during the war. He retried in 1949 and returned to England.

Field Marshal Kodandera Madappa Cariappa  16 January 1949- 14 January 1953 

The first Indian Chief of the Indian Army and led the Indian forces on the Western Front during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1947. He is among only two Indian Army officers to hold the highest rank of Field Marshal (the other being Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw). His distinguished military career spanned almost three decades, at the highest point of which, he was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Military in 1949.

On outbreak of war with Pakistan in 1947, he as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, directed operations for the recapture of Zojila, Drass and Kargil and to re-establish a linkup with Leh. In all this, he showed tremendous energy in moving troops, against considerable odds and finally ensuring success. This ensured his elevation to the supreme post of commander in chief. There were  two officers senior to him — both King Commissioned Officers (from Sandhurst) of the 1918 batch. KS Mahadeo Singh and MS Himmat Singh ji.  Mahadeo Singh had not enough combat experience and was superseded by Cariappa during the Second World War itself and finally he retired in 1948. MS Himmat Singh ji remained as a prisoner of war in Japan for 4 years (1939–43), which made him lose war experience. 

There is an interesting episode regarding the appointment of Cariappa. The authenticity is to be verified.

Jawaharlal  Nehru , it appears,  called a meeting of army officers perhaps when Gen Bucher was to retire.

Nehru proposed, "I think we should appoint a British officer as a General of The Indian Army as we don't have enough experience to lead the same." One officer Nathu Singh Rathore asked for permission to speak.

Nehru was a bit taken aback , however he  asked him to speak freely.

Rathore said ,"You see, sir, we don't have enough experience to lead a nation too, so shouldn't we appoint a British person as the first Prime Minister of India?"

You could hear a pin drop.

After a pregnant pause, Nehru asked Rathore, "Are you ready to be the first General of The Indian Army ?"

Rathore declined the offer saying "Sir, we have a very talented army officer, my senior, Lt. Gen. Cariappa, who is the most deserving among us."

 I am not sure how far this story is true. However Lt. Gen SK Sinha has a different story to narrate. I  narrate it at the cost of repetition.   " KM Cariappa, a senior most  Commander,was  to take over as Army Chief. The political bosses wanted  to have Rajendra Sinhji,  junior to him, appointed as chief. Sinhji was the brother of the Jam Saheb of Navanagar . WhenRajendra Sinhji heard of this, he told Jawaharlal Nehru that he would rather resign if he was appointed the chief.  Not only Cariappa was senior to him , but also  his supersession will  lead to political interference in the selection of Army Chief. Cariappa was appointed the chief. " Of Course, Rajendra Sinhji became the Chief,  when he was due.

There is another reason as to why Nehru was not very enthusiastic in appointing Cariappa as Chief . Cariappa wanted  that he be given another three months to drive the Pakistanis from the occupied areas in Kashmir. Nehru over ruled him and took up the matter in the UN much against the advise of even some of the cabinet colleagues. The rest is history and we are paying the price  for it even to day and no knows for how ling we will continue to do so.  Cariappa's  initiative projected him as ambitious and perhaps that was the reason why he wanted  either a Britisher to head the Army  or in his place Rajendra Sinhji.

Contrary what SS Khera portrays ( in his book " India's Defence Problem" Orient Longmans 1968  - about this book later in a special post) about the King's commissioned Officers who held top posts after independence Cariappa was a visionary.His request to Nehru to give him time to push out the intrusion in  Kashmir in 1948-49 shows his foresight. He correctly felt  as per his quote "In modern warfare, a large army is not sufficient, it needs industrial potential behind it. If the army is the first line of defence, the industry is the second." He was very firm that the Army should be a secular and apolitical entity.    "Army is there to serve the Government of the day, and we should make sure that it does not get mixed up with party politics. A soldier is above politics and should not believe in caste or creed". He lived and remained, as he said, "an Indian and to the last breath would remain an Indian. To me there is only two Stans - Hindustan (India) and Foujistan (the Army)."

During the 1965 war, his son, an Indian Air Force pilot, was shot down over Pakistan. He was captured and imprisoned as a POW. When Ayub Khan learned about this, he informed Cariappa he would not be kept in a POW Camp like other Indian POWs, since Ayub Khan had served under him  before independence. But Cariappa politely declined the offer, saying that every soldier in the Indian Army was his son, so he could not request special privileges for only one. Such was the integrity and moral courage of Cariappa. 

General  Rajendra Sinhji Jadeja  15 January 1953 - 14 May 1955

Rajendra Sinhji  joined the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 2nd Royal Lancers in 1922. As a King's Commissioned Indian Officer, he held various ranks and offices in the British Indian Army and served with distinction during World War II.

During this critical period after partition , he shouldered  many onerous responsibilities. He was made Brigadier in 1946, Major-General in 1947 and Lt. General in 1948. He served successively as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Delhi and East Punjab (1947-48) looking after the refugee problems as well as division of military assets between India nad Pakistan; GOC Eastern Command (1948); and GOC Southern Command (1948-53). Operation Polo, which resulted in the integration of Hyderabad State with India, was executed during his term in office as GOC (South).

As the senior-most serving officer in the army, Rajendrasinhji was appointed Commander-in-Chief of India on 14 January 1953, following the retirement of General  K. M. Cariappa. Rajendrasinhji received the rank of General on the same day. With effect from 1 April 1955, the President of India was constitutionally designated the Commander-in-chief of India's armed forces. Rajendrasinhji then became the first head of the Indian army to be designated Chief of Army Staff. ( About Change of designation and Warrant pf Precedence in a later post).

General Satyawant Mallannah Shrinagesh  15 May 1955 - 7 May 1957

Among the earliest batches of Indians to be nominated for the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in the U.K. was subsequently commissioned into the 19th Hyderabad Regiment (presently the Kumaon Regiment) in 1923. The British those days had a system of quota for the erstwhile Princely States in India to nominate their wards for entry into Sandhrst.  Srinagesh's father was the Court Physician of the Nizam of Hyderabad and it is believed that the quota of Hyderabad was given to him. 

Till  1945, he was the Commanding Officer of the 6/19th Hyderabad Regiment (now 6th Kumaon). He then officiated as the Brigade Commander of the 64th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 19th Indian (Dagger) Division in Burma from August 1945. He was the first Indian Commandant of the Kumaon Regimental Centre in Agra in 1946. He was selected to go to Germany as Deputy Chief of the Indian Military Mission in November 1945. In that capacity, he  worked as the Economic Adviser & Consul looking after the interests of Indian nationals in Germany and locating missing Prisoners of War (POWs).He was then chosen to lead the 268th Infantry Brigade British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in post World War II Japan and served in that post till 1947.On his return from Japan, he was promoted to Major-General and was appointed the General Officer Commanding of the Madras Area. He was the overall commander of all troops in Jammu & Kashmir during the 1947–48 Indo-Pak War and held this command till the ceasefire on 1 January 1949. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in 1950,  he was  appointed as the GOC-in-C Southern Command and held that post, till he assumed charge as the Army Chief  in 1955.

Genera Kodandera Subayya Thimayya  l 8 May 1957 - 7 May 1961

After  his graduation from RIMC, "Timmy", as Thimayya  was affectionately known, was one of only six Indian cadets selected for further training at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He was commissioned into the British Indian Army in 1926 into 8/19th Hyderabads  (presently known as Kumoan Regiment).

In Burma, he  as Commanding Officer of the 8/19th Hyderabads,  led  it with outstanding success in battle. He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier in the field in 1945. For his outstanding service in battle, he was awarded the much coveted Distinguished Service Order (D.S.O) and also a Mention-in-Dispatches.

His innate talents of professional soldiering and leadership were soon recognized by Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. He was specially selected to lead the 268th Indian Infantry Brigade as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan after World War II. He got this assignment due to his outstanding battle experience as a Brigadier and being the only Indian to command a battle formation in the field.

He  proved  not only as  an outstanding commander but also  as a charming and skillful personality in dealing with such people as  General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander of the Southwest Pacific Theatre, the other Allies  and even the vanquished Japanese.

Thimmayya represented the country during the surrender of the Japanese in Singapore, followed by the surrender of the Japanese in the Philippines. As Indian Independence approached, he was recalled to India by then Commander-in-chief of British India, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck.

He returned to India in 1947, during the Partition, as member of the committee to agree to the allotment of weapons, equipment and regiments that were to remain in India, or to be allotted to Pakistan. Soon after the commission was completed, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General in September 1947 and was given  the command of the 4th Infantry Division and  the Punjab Boundary Force, dealing with the exodus and intake of refugees. In 1948 he was one of the active officers in the actions against the forces of Pakistan in the conflict over Kashmir. His commanded  the 19th Infantry Division in Jammu & Kashmir where he succeeded in driving the raiders and the Pakistan Army out of the Kashmir Valley. Personally leading the attack in the forwardmost tank, the surprise attack on Zoji La on 1 November 1948 by a brigade with Stuart Light Tanks of the 7th Light Cavalry, he succeeded in driving out the entrenched raiders and Pakistan Army regulars and  recaptured Dras, Kargil and Leh. He established the best of relations with Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and even Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.  His pleas through the C-in- C , Gen Kariappa  to give him three more months to drive the raiders back to Muzzarfarabad fell on deaf ears. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru went to the United Nations. The rest is history.

In 1959, he handed his resignation in protest to Prime Minister Nehru due to Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon's refusal to consider his plans for preparing the Army for any likely confrontation with the Chinese and also for promoting Kaul , superseding Gyani and Kumaramangalam , out of turn. (There was an uproar in the parliament on Kaul's promotion and Nehru himself had to defend the undefensible. Gyani was however promoted soon thereafter.)  Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru refused to accept it and persuaded him in withdrawing his resignation. However, little action was taken on Thimmayya's recommendations and he continued as the Army Chief till his retirement on 7 May 1961. In 1962, China attacked an unprepared Indian Army in NEFA.

( Details of  Indian Army's preparedness or the lack of it in a seperate post later).

After retirement from the Indian Army, the United Nations sought his services yet once again. He was appointed as the Commander of UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in July 1964. He died  of heart attack during this time in December 1965.  The street perpendicular to East Street (a road parallel to MG road in Pune),the Richmond Road in Bangalore and the main road through Larnaca/Cyprus (East to West) were renamed as Gen Thimmayya Road, in his memory. The Republic of Cyprus, also honored him by issuing a commemorative stamp in his memory in 1966.

General Pran Nath Thapar   8 May 1961- 19 November 1962

Trained at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, he was commissioned into the 1st Punjab Regiment in 1926. He served in Burma during the second World War and later in the Middle East and Italy. He commanded 1st Battalion of the 1st Punjab Regiment in Indonesia in 1946 and later went on to serve as the Commander of the 161 Indian Infantry Brigade in East Bengal. In November 1947, he was promoted to the rank of Major General. He served as the Chief of the General Staff for a few months and later as Military Secretary until August 1949. He was appointed Master General of Ordnance on August 1949. He commanded an Infantry Division for four years till 1954 and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in 1954 as Commander of a Corps. He became General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Command in 1959 and took over as Chief of Army Staff  when Gen. Thimayya relinquished office. He was heading the Indian army during Chinese aggression and the Indian army suffered it's worse humiliation under  his leadership in the war. He resigned from his post in disgrace.

He along with Gen. BM Kaul were considered the confidante of the then Defence Minister VKK Menon and also Jawharlal Nehru.  When Kaul was promoted out of turn, Gen Thimayya tendered his resignation.

On his becoming the Chief of Army Staff who was next in line of seniority after Thimayya,  Kaul  a comparatively junior officer was made the Chief of the General Staff which was the top staff appointment. Thapar did nothing to impress on the Defence Minister to reconsider Kaul's elevation as the other officers in the top echelons might get a feeling that their careers and promotions might well depend on such relationships and associations with the political bosses rather than merit. Here again none of the bureaucrats in the MoD or not even the cabinet Secretary tendered correct advice to either the Defence minister or to the Prime Minister, nor Gen. Thapar had the moral courage to desist the appointment of Kaul as CGS.  Instead ,

Gen. Thapar soon surrounded himself with his yes men by large scale transfer of top military commanders. Eventually when the Chinese aggression became imminent and  Kaul was posted as the Corps Commander of a newly raised Corps at Tejpur to confront the Chinese, he proved to every one his lack of leadership traits needed for a military commander. Thapar had to tender his resignation as the Chief of Army Staff.

The Defence Minister himself had to resign due to public outcry.