Enquiries:
On April 1, 1963, Defence Minister Y.B.
Chavan informed the Lok Sabha that “with my approval the Chief of
Army Staff [COAS] had ordered a thorough investigation to be carried
out”. He specified the issues for the probe. The task was entrusted
to Lieutenant-General T.B. Henderson-Brooks and Brigadier P.S.
Bhagat. On May 12, they submitted their report to the COAS, who, in
turn, forwarded it to the Defence Minister, with his comments, on
July 2. Chavan made a formal statement on the report to the Lok Sabha
on September 2, 1963.
in 2008, the Defense Minister, Mr AK
Antony told the indian Parliament that the Herderson Brooks could not be declassified. Mr
Antony claimed that the report could not be made public because an
internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents
“are not only extremely sensitive but are of current
operational value.” It is ridiculous to assume that a more than half-a-decade old report can still claim to have any ‘operational value’. It is also illogical that the " Official History of the Conflict with China (1962)" prepared by
the History Department of the Defence Ministry, which details all aspects of the war and ‘operations’ in full details is available in public domain. This report is available at
Many reasons can be advanced as to why the Government is so secretive about this report. May be, because while Lt.Gen.
Handerson Brooks and Brig. PS Bhagat would have in their report analysed the events threadbare especially the role played by Kaul, Thapar and BN Mullick or the lack of it. BN Mullick in spite of his failing as IB Chief continued to wield enormous clout and remained as its head for 17 long years. PS Bhagat was a no nonsense man and would call a spade a spade. He became well aware of he failings of various departments of the Government machinery leading to the 1962 debacle by virtue of his association in drafting the report.as a c0-member. May be that could be one of the the
reasons why Lt.Gen. PS Bhagat was denied to become COAS by giving an extension to GG Bewoor though at that point in time there was any imminent external threat or internal disturbance.( more on
it else where).
About Neville Maxwell
Neville Maxwell was a British journalist
who in 1959 , was posted to New Delhi as South Asia correspondent.
In 1967 he went as a senior fellow to the School of Oriental and
African Studies in London in order to write India's China War. He was
with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford University at
the time when his book “India's China War”was published in 1971.
Maxwell's characterisations of India in general, and of the
India-China conflict in particular, are deeply biased against India,
and in favour of China. Accordingly, his reputation remains poor here and decidedly mixed among Western scholars. Other historical
blunders by Neville Maxwell include his assessment in the 1960s that
India would no longer remain a democracy for much longer. While
serving as the subcontinental correspondent of The Times of London,
Maxwell authored a series of pessimistic reports filed in February
1967. In the atmosphere leading up to the 4th Lok Sabha elections, he
wrote that "The great experiment of developing India within a
democratic framework has failed. [Indians will soon vote] in the
fourth—and surely last—general election."
In its reference to “an
unpublished Indian Army report on these events” and, indeed, the
contents of the book, left none in doubt that he had had access to
the report. All doubt has since been dispelled by his citation of
precise details of the report in an article entitled
“Henderson-Brooks Report: An Introduction” published in the
Economic and Political Weekly on April 14, 2001, He subsequently put
it up on the Internet. He wrote: “The Henderson-Brooks Report is
long (its main section, excluding recommendations and many annexures,
covers nearly 200 foolscap pages), detailed and far ranging. This
introduction will touch only upon some select points, to give the
flavour of the whole…..”
Claude Arpi, in an
article in the Jan/Mar ‘11 issue of "Indian Defence Review" states " While the information contained in Maxwell’s book originates from
the Herderson brooks report of the 1962 debacle, this
document is today the most well-kept secret of the Indian Government. Does it make sense that
an episode commented on by Heads of State of the united States and China in the 1970’s, is
still hidden from the Indian public in 2010? It seems that the
official answer is ‘yes’. "
The full text of the article can be read at the following link.
The Chief of Army Staff:
General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri 20
November 1962 - 7 June 1966
After passing out from Royal Military College at Sandhurst, JN Chaudhuri joined the Indian Army in February 1928 and quickly rose through the ranks; he was awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his services in South East Asia theatre as a cavalry/tank commander.He was honoured for his services in world war two by allowing him leadership of Indian contingent in the victory parade at London.Following a course at the Imperial
Defense College at England in 1947 he was appointed
Director of Military Operations & Intelligence at Army
headquarters in New Delhi in November 1947. He commanded the 1948 Operation Polo to
annex Hyderabad in September 1948 and served as the Military Governor
of Hyderabad State (1948–49). He was promoted to the rank of
General in 1962 and took over as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) after Gen PN Thapar tendered his resignation. Had VKK Menon remained as the Defence Minister, it was improbable that he would have made it to the Chief's rank since it was a known fact that Menon was not favorably disposed of towards Chaudhury.
He handled the delicate post-war situation firmly and took several decisions to empower the armed forces.
The after effects of 1962 War
He handled the delicate post-war situation firmly and took several decisions to empower the armed forces.
The after effects of 1962 War
The 1962 war brought about an increased awareness to the politicians and general public about the strength and weaknesses of the Indian Armed Forces. In the fifties the defence expenditure was just about sufficient to meet the pay and pension and minimum maintenance of military hardware handed over by the British.
Any proposal for a normal increase even to meet the cost escalation in the annual budget met with strong opposition in Parliament. There was no induction of new equipment and the Army , having to keep the troops busy and trim has to devise ways and means to keep them engaged especially in peace areas. They were derisively called "Parade Ground Army". There were not proper Offices even for the Army, Navy or Air Force Headquarters.Thanks to temporary hutments built by the British adjacent to the South Block for their use for the Second World war, the departments could find some semblance of office accommodation. One can well imagine the state of affairs in lower formations and units. ( It would take another decade to lay the foundation stone for Sena Bhawan in New Delhi).
It came as a rude shock to Jawaharlal Nehru, that in spite of the fact that he was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) with Tito and Nasser , neither they nor any other member of NAM came to his rescue during the 1962 crisis. It was again to US , Nehru had to beg for assistance for providing military hardware. It is a moot point that whatever was received by way of US Aid was too little too late. However it gave at east an idea of how these modern equipment will be indispensable for equipping our Armed Forces.
Self reliance was the new mantra. Organisations such as Defence Research and Development, Factories for manufacturing motor transport, tanks, aircraft, ships under Public Sector were getting established. Without a sound industrial, engineering design backing locally these were initially tasked to assemble foreign supplied kits. The indiginization has to suffer due to the Nehruvian economic policy of "quota-license-permit." HAL, Tank factory at Avadi, Vehicle Factory at Jabalpur , Rifle Factory at Ishapore , Naval Dock yard for building frigates came into being. ( A separate post on how some of these have degenerated into trading houses and centres of corruption later). It was anathema to involve private industry in any defence related enterprise to the skewed thinking that it would impinge on security. The bureaucrats started wielding enormous clout as they would be the people to clear quotas, licenses and permits. While there were no major scams involving them those days as we see them today, their powers and thereby their arrogance climbed up exponentially and has not abated ever since.
With acute funds at the disposal of the Armed Forces , there was bound to be a fierce competition to have the bigger share of the cake between Army, Navy and Air Force. With post of Commander-in-Chief abolished, the umpiring has to be done by the Defence Minister to lay down priorities which he would generally pass it on to the Defence Secretary. Therefore he now became all too powerful a man. He could promote inter service rivalry , which is a natural ingredient in most of the armies especially among the British Armed Forces, whose legacy we acquired. It was in this scenario that the nation faced the Pakistan aggression of 1965.
( About inter service and intra- service rivalry I intend discussing them in a separate post)Any proposal for a normal increase even to meet the cost escalation in the annual budget met with strong opposition in Parliament. There was no induction of new equipment and the Army , having to keep the troops busy and trim has to devise ways and means to keep them engaged especially in peace areas. They were derisively called "Parade Ground Army". There were not proper Offices even for the Army, Navy or Air Force Headquarters.Thanks to temporary hutments built by the British adjacent to the South Block for their use for the Second World war, the departments could find some semblance of office accommodation. One can well imagine the state of affairs in lower formations and units. ( It would take another decade to lay the foundation stone for Sena Bhawan in New Delhi).
It came as a rude shock to Jawaharlal Nehru, that in spite of the fact that he was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) with Tito and Nasser , neither they nor any other member of NAM came to his rescue during the 1962 crisis. It was again to US , Nehru had to beg for assistance for providing military hardware. It is a moot point that whatever was received by way of US Aid was too little too late. However it gave at east an idea of how these modern equipment will be indispensable for equipping our Armed Forces.
Self reliance was the new mantra. Organisations such as Defence Research and Development, Factories for manufacturing motor transport, tanks, aircraft, ships under Public Sector were getting established. Without a sound industrial, engineering design backing locally these were initially tasked to assemble foreign supplied kits. The indiginization has to suffer due to the Nehruvian economic policy of "quota-license-permit." HAL, Tank factory at Avadi, Vehicle Factory at Jabalpur , Rifle Factory at Ishapore , Naval Dock yard for building frigates came into being. ( A separate post on how some of these have degenerated into trading houses and centres of corruption later). It was anathema to involve private industry in any defence related enterprise to the skewed thinking that it would impinge on security. The bureaucrats started wielding enormous clout as they would be the people to clear quotas, licenses and permits. While there were no major scams involving them those days as we see them today, their powers and thereby their arrogance climbed up exponentially and has not abated ever since.
With acute funds at the disposal of the Armed Forces , there was bound to be a fierce competition to have the bigger share of the cake between Army, Navy and Air Force. With post of Commander-in-Chief abolished, the umpiring has to be done by the Defence Minister to lay down priorities which he would generally pass it on to the Defence Secretary. Therefore he now became all too powerful a man. He could promote inter service rivalry , which is a natural ingredient in most of the armies especially among the British Armed Forces, whose legacy we acquired. It was in this scenario that the nation faced the Pakistan aggression of 1965.
No comments:
Post a Comment